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Summary 
Fleeing the horrors of an internal armed conflict constitutes a ground for 
subsidiary protection in the Swedish Aliens’ Act. However, what is to be 
defined as such a conflict is disputed, which is obvious from the divergent 
views on the ongoing situation in Iraq. In 2007 the Migration Court of Ap-
peal established the situation as severe, but as not amounting to an armed 
conflict. This conclusion met strong resistance from NGOs as well as from 
the academia. 
  
By applying three different perspectives, the aim of this thesis is to provide 
the reader with insight in how and why the interpretation of internal armed 
conflicts as presented by the Court, can be criticized. The main hypothesis 
to be proven is that the interpretation is incoherent and inadequate. 
 
The first perspective entails a formal legal approach, establishing lex lata. 
Since the Swedish Aliens’ Act bases its interpretation of internal armed con-
flicts on international humanitarian law, the examination comprises instru-
ments and case- law of both international humanitarian law and migration 
law. Also relevant EU- law is taken into account. From this examination it 
becomes clear that the legal sources of international humanitarian law and 
migration law both fail to coherently determine what is to be defined as an 
internal armed conflict. 
 
In a second, historical, perspective the reasons of this incoherency is sought. 
Firstly by taking a look at the historical legal regulation of internal conflicts 
and its development in international humanitarian law, and relating this with 
the application of subsidiary protection in migration law. Secondly, by ex-
amining the changing nature of conflicts over time and comparing this real-
ity with the legal concepts. This brief historical survey shows that the con-
ception of internal conflicts has changed only insignificantly since the 18th 
century. The regime of recognition of belligerency used then was based on 
the same considerations as do the application of subsidiary protection. The 
static legal concept of armed conflicts is identified as problematic since the 
characteristics of internal conflicts have changed rather radically after the 
end of Second World War. Thus is seems like the law bases itself on an 
anachronic perception of the nature conflicts. 
 
In a third perspective, an alternative interpretation is sought in the field of 
peace- and conflict research. A definition as provided by Uppsala Univer-
sity, entailing a numerical variable as a decisive requisite, is presented and 
analyzed. The definition is dismissed, but the assessment strengthens the 
overall conclusion in the thesis: that any concept of armed conflicts entail-
ing too formal criteria is deceiving and not suitable within the context of 
migration law. 
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Sammanfattning 
Att fly en intern väpnad konflikt utgör grund för subsidiärt skydd i den 
svenska utlänningslagen. Emellertid är det oklart vad som utgör en sådan 
konflikt, vilket är tydligt från de olika uppfattningarna om situationen i Irak. 
Migrationsöverdomstolen fastställde 2007 att situationen i landet är svår, 
men att det inte pågår vad som kan anses som en väpnad konflikt. Domslu-
tet mötte stark kritik från flera människorättsorganisationer och från freds- 
och konfliktsexperter. Genom att utgå från tre olika perspektiv, är syftet 
med detta examensarbete att kunna erbjuda läsaren insikt om hur och varför 
Migrationsöverdomstolens tolkning av begreppet intern väpnad konflikt kan 
kritiseras. Uppsatsen huvudsakliga hypotes är att tolkningen är både inkohe-
rent och inadekvat. 
 
Det första perspektivet utgår från rättsdogmatisk metod för att fastställa gäl-
lande rätt. Eftersom den svenska utlänningslagen baserar sin tolkning av 
begreppet intern väpnad konflikt på hur konceptet används i internationell 
humanitärrätt, så innefattar undersökningen rättskällor från både humanitär-
rätten och migrationsrätten. Analysen av gällande rätt visar att det inte finns 
någon koherent definition av vad som utgör en intern väpnad konflik, var-
ken i humanitärrätten eller i svensk utlänningsrätt.  
 
I ett historiskt perspektiv söks orsakerna till denna inkoherens. Dels genom 
en undersökning av den historiska rättsliga regleringen samt utvecklingen 
av interna väpnade konflikter i internationell humanitärrätt. Dels genom att 
studera förändringar i konflikters natur under de senaste århundradena och 
relatera detta till de rättsliga koncepten. Den historiska översikten visar att 
begreppet intern väpnad konflikt endast förändrats obetydligt alltsedan 
1700- talet. Doktrinen om ‘erkännande av stridande part’1 som var dåtidens 
rättsliga reglering, bär stora likheter med staters tillämpning av subsidiärt 
skydd, genom att diplomatiska hänsyn styr . Det konstateras vidare att det 
statiska rättsliga konceptet av hur väpnade konflikter ser ut rimmar illa med 
verkligheten. Alltsedan slutet av andra världskriget har konflikter utkämpa-
de runt om i världen förändrats radikalt i karaktär. Detta innebär att lagen 
verkar utgå från en anakronistisk uppfattning om vad som utgör en konflikt.   
 
I det tredje och sista perspektivet undersöks en alternativ tolkning av väpna-
de konflikter hämtad från freds- och konfliktforskningen. En akademisk 
definition med en numerär variabel som främsta avgörande kriterium, ana-
lyseras utifrån en migrationsrättslig kontext. Definitionen avfärdas som en 
olämplig rättslig lösning, men slutsatserna om den stärker det huvudsakliga 
argumentet i uppsatsen: att samtliga definitioner av väpnade konflikter som 
bygger på alltför formella kriterier ter sig olämpliga i en migrationsrättslig 
kontext. 
                                                 
1 På engelska: recognition of belligerency 
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Abbreviations 
The 1949 Geneva  Conventions I-IV adopted at Geneva, 12 August 
Conventions 1949 
 
Common article 3 or Article 3 common to the 1949 Geneva 
article 3 Conventions 
 
EU  European Union 
 
ICJ  International Court of Justice 
 
ICRC  International Committee of the Red Cross
 
ICTR  International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
 
ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia 
 
IHL  International Humanitarian Law 
 
NGO  Non- Governmental Organisation 
 
The Protocol or Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions 
Protocol II of August 12, 1949 and relating to the protection 
of Victims of Non- International Armed Con-
flicts of 8 June, 1977 
 
UCDP  Uppsala Conflict Data Project 
 
UNHCR  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
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1 Introduction 
“Sweden, a European haven for Iraqi refugees, starts shutting the door”2
 
This headline was to be found in the International Herald Tribune in July 
2007, following decisions of the Swedish Migration Board to deny protec-
tion to asylum seekers from southern and central Iraq. These decisions 
marked a shift in the Swedish policy towards Iraqi asylum seekers. From 
previously granting protection because of the general turmoil in Iraq, the 
Board now altered to requiring an individual threat or harassment because 
of the ongoing conflict. This shift was based on three preceding judgements 
of the Migration Court of Appeal in 2007, clarifying the status of the situa-
tion in Iraq. In these cases, the Court concluded the situation of Iraq to be 
severe, however falling short as an internal armed conflict in the meaning of 
international law and chapter 4 section 2 of the Alien’s Act3. 
 
Migration Board Director, Dan Eliasson, said that the court’s “interpretation 
of the migration law, which guides us, means that the general situation [in 
Iraq] does not automatically lead to asylum, but the applicant must cite in-
dividual reasons. /.../ The consequence will probably be that fewer asylum 
seekers will be granted asylum in Sweden”4
 
Critics have regarded this ‘reinterpretation’ of the Aliens’ Act as an answer 
to the disproportionate number of Iraqis granted protection in Sweden, in 
comparison with the rest of the Europe. More than a third of the total num-
ber of Iraqis seeking asylum in Europe in 2006 and the first quarters of 
2007, have been granted protection in Sweden.5 Concerns have been raised 
on the ability of the Swedish welfare system to manage this influx of peo-
ple.6
 
                                                 
2 The Associated Press, ‘Sweden, a European Haven for Iraqi Refugees, Starts Shutting the 
Door’, The International Herald Tribune, 6 July 2007 (available at <www.iht.com/articles/ 
ap/2007/07/06/europe/EU-GEN-Sweden-Iraqi-Refugees.php> visited on 2008-01-28) 
3 Utlänningslag (Aliens’ Act) SFS 2005:716 
4 The Associated Press, ‘Sweden, a European Haven for Iraqi Refugees, Starts Shutting the 
Door’, The International Herald Tribune, 6 July 2007 (available at <www.iht.com/articles/ 
ap/2007/07/06/europe/EU-GEN-Sweden-Iraqi-Refugees.php> visited on 2008-01-28) 
5 In 2006 about 19 400 persons from Iraq applied for asylum in European countries, of 
which about 9000 were granted protection in Sweden. Between January and June 2007, 
about 19 200 sought asylum, of which 4 800 have been recognized protection in Sweden. 
See UNHCR, Asylum levels and trends in industrialized countries 2006, 23 March 2006 
pp. 14 and 16 (available at <www.unhcr.org/statistics/STATISTICS/460150272.pdf>, 
visited on 2008-01-28); UNHCR Asylum levels and trends in industrialized countries sec-
ond quarter 2007, 21 September 2007, pp. 13 and 19, (available at 
<www.unhcr.org/statistics/ STATISTICS/46f0e0dd2.pdf>, visited on 2008-01-28) 
6 The Associated Press, ‘Sweden, a European Haven for Iraqi Refugees, Starts Shutting the 
Door’, The International Herald Tribune, 6 July 2007 (available at <www.iht.com/articles/ 
ap/2007/07/06/europe/EU-GEN-Sweden-Iraqi-Refugees.php> visited on 2008-01-28) 
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The authorities’ assessment of the Iraqi conflict has met strong resistance 
from NGOs. Christer Zettergren, head of the Swedish Red Cross, has stated: 
“It's an absurd decision/.../ Of course there is an internal armed conflict. If 
these are the consequences, and the court says this is the law /.../then we 
have to change the law.”7 Also experts within in the field of peace- and con-
flict research have found the decision unreasonable. Professor Peter Wallen-
steen concludes: “The law must correspond to a correct description of the 
reality. We cannot have a description of the reality that the general public, 
the researchers and the experts do not agree on”.8
 
The critique of the recent decisions on Iraqi asylum seekers touches upon 
interesting issues. Apparently, there are divergent views on how to define 
the conflict. So what then is the law; what is ‘an internal armed conflict’? 
And if, as both Zettergren and Wallensteen are suggesting, the current con-
cept is not satisfying, why is that so? 
 
1.1 Subject and Purpose 
Taken from the facts outlined above, my hypothesis is that the concept of 
internal armed conflicts in Swedish migration law is incoherent and inade-
quate in some way. The aim of this thesis is to examine if this is true, and 
furthermore to look for explanations and alternatives. Since the Migration 
Court of Appeal bases its interpretation on international law, or more ex-
actly on international humanitarian law (IHL)9, the term internal armed con-
flict will be examined in migration law and IHL collaterally. Furthermore, 
in order to grasp the fully context of the concept, I will approach the con-
cept from three different perspectives. 
 
The first perspective is one of lex lata, entailing a formal legal review of 
relevant sources of law. The aim is to identify problems with the definition 
of internal armed conflicts as it stands today, in migration law as well in 
IHL. 
 
The second perspective is historical. In order to explain a phenomenon one 
often needs to look in the rear- mirror. Thus, I will examine the historical 
development of regulation of internal conflicts in IHL, and relate this to lex 
lata of migration law. Furthermore, I will take a look at the reality of the 
concept: the conflicts as such. I will briefly examine their development from 
the birth of the modern state in the 17th century up to today’s conflict in 
Iraq. 
                                                 
7 A. Cox, ‘INTERVIEW-Swedish Minister Insists Iraqi Asylum Policy Fair’, Reuters, 10 
July 2007 (available at <www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSL09885483>, visited on 
2008-01-28) 
8 O. Wijnbladh, ‘Irak Är “Det Värsta Kriget i Världen”’, Dagens Nyheter, 13 July 2007 
(available at <www.dn.se/DNet/jsp/polopoly.jsp?d=147&a=670536>, visited on 2008-01-
28) 
9 This is obvious from the preparatory works and the case- law concerning protection on 
the ground of internal armed conflicts. See further in chapter 3.4. 
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My third perspective aims at finding an alternative interpretation of armed 
conflicts, and this will be accomplished by recourse to another discipline: 
peace- and conflict research. Analysing a definition as provided by the Upp-
sala Data Conflict Project (UCDP), I will assess whether this could be a 
suitable legal solution. 
 
Seemingly, my approach in this thesis is fairly ambitious. However, my 
purpose is not to provide for in depth- analyses of each and every perspec-
tive. Rather, the aim is to be able to provide the reader with insight in how 
and why the Court’s interpretation of internal armed conflicts can be criti-
cized in a number of ways. The core of the thesis is not so much the conclu-
sions per se, but the ‘new’ way(s) suggested in approaching the issue. 
 
1.2 Method and Materials 
In conducting this thesis I hold a comparative approach comprising three 
different perspectives. Thus, I make use of various methods and materials, 
depending on the issue at hand. The perspective de lege lata will be exam-
ined and analysed using traditional legal method10. Relevant sources of law 
comprise three levels: international law, EU- law and Swedish law. Since 
this is a rather ambitious task, I have limited the material to a great extent. 
Concerning the examination of international treaties, I only take into ac-
count instruments comprising or touching upon customary law. As regards 
the study of relevant case- law I have only considered cases of precedent 
value.11
 
Since I am neither a legal historian nor an expert within the field of peace- 
and conflict research, my descriptions from these perspectives are rather 
modest. I have mainly relied on the works of acknowledged authors within 
respective field. I look through the glasses of a judicial scholar, thus the 
conclusions are somewhat nearsighted, in spite of the multidisciplinary ap-
proach. However, the aim is not to present an exhaustive historical perspec-
tive, or one of peace- and conflict research, but to identify patterns and re-
late them with migration law. From this point of view, I have concluded the 
method of so called desk research to be satisfactory. 
 
                                                 
10 Review comprising laws, legal documents, customs, general principles, judicial decisions 
and doctrine. Cf. article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice concluded at 
San Francisco, on 26 of June 1945 
11 As regards the international case- law the cases have been selected after conferring doc-
trine. As to Swedish case- law, I have limited my self to cases decided by the Government 
(according to the former decision procedure in alien issues) and the Migration Court of 
Appeal. 
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1.3 Delimitations 
The term internal armed conflicts exists in several different fields of law. 
This thesis is mainly limited to Swedish migration law. The description of 
international law and EU- law is thus strictly limited to the concept of 
armed conflicts, disregarding the application of any rules associated with 
the definition. 
 
I will focus only on internal armed conflicts and the lower threshold of the 
concept. Thus, the distinction between internal and international or even 
internationalized internal conflicts will mainly be left out. The reason for 
this is that the upper threshold for internal conflicts is irrelevant for the aim 
of this thesis, since the Swedish Aliens’ Act covers both internal and inter-
national conflicts. 
 
Overall, in my examination de lege lata I will focus restrictively on how 
armed conflicts are defined. I will not go into detail of the rather complex 
requisites that the concerned provisions comprise, unless it is necessary to 
fulfil my aim. As regards article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive12, I will 
not go into any detail of the requirement of individualization of the threat13. 
Neither, will I examine the concept of ‘other grave conflicts’, that is the 
second passage of chapter 4 section 2 of the Aliens Act. One could argue 
that whatever gap of protection a restrictive approach towards internal 
armed conflict would create, this would be consumed by the ground ‘other 
grave conflicts’. Thus, dwelling on the concept of internal armed conflicts 
would seem superfluous. I however, do not find this conclusion convincing. 
If this was the case, then the first passage of chapter 4 section 2 of the 
Aliens Act would serve no purpose. But foremost, such a conclusion disre-
gard the utterly importance between passage one and two: the latter clearly 
requires a higher degree of individualization.14
 
In the historical perspective, it is not possible to give any exhaustive or pro-
found description of this within the frames of this thesis. Thus, I have lim-
ited myself to clearly distinguishable patterns and key events, as identified 
and analysed in relevant doctrine. 
 
As regards the examination of an alternative interpretation of internal armed 
conflicts, I only look at the definition as laid down by UCDP. There are 
several definitions to choose from in the field of peace- and conflict re-
                                                 
12 Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualifica-
tion and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who 
otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted, Official 
Journal L 304 of 30 September 2004 pp.12 -23 [hereinafter the Qualification Directive] 
13 For an excellent overview of this, please see J. McAdam, ‘The European Union Qualifi-
cation Directive: The Creation of a Subsidiary Protection Regime’, International Journal of 
Refugee Law, (2005) Vol. 17 No. 3, pp. 461- 516
14 See Government Proposal Ny Instans- och Processordning i Utlännings- och Medbor-
garskapsärenden, Prop. 2004/05:170, 26 May 2005 (available at <www.regeringen.se/sb/ 
d/108/a/45568>, visited on 2008-01-28), at p. 274 
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search. But since the temporal and spatial frame for this thesis do not allow 
a more comprehensive presentation of different definitions, I have decided 
to go into more depth of just one. I have chosen the definition of UCDP, 
since this is the most well- established project, covering conflicts up to this 
date and the one frequently used in academic research. 
 
1.4 Outline 
In order to keep the line of arguments as accessible as possible and above all 
to keep the reading interesting, I have found it necessary to divide the thesis 
into distinguishable parts, representing each of the perspectives outlined 
above. Every part consists of a descriptive presentation of the relevant per-
spective, with following conclusions. 
 
Firstly, I will give a very brief background of IHL and migration law. 
Thereafter follows an examination of lex lata, comprising international hu-
manitarian law, and migration law on a European and Swedish domestic 
level. This chapter is the most comprehensive and dense one, since it founds 
the base of the rest of the thesis. In subsequent chapters 4 and 5 the histori-
cal context and development of internal conflicts will be dealt with: the his-
tory of international regulation of internal conflicts in IHL is studied and 
related to the concept(s) of today in migration law. In chapter 5, the chal-
lenge posed by new kinds of conflicts is presented and discussed in relation 
to lex lata. Finally, in chapter 6, an alternative interpretation of internal 
armed conflicts as presented by peace- and conflict research, is examined. 
The conclusions of precedent chapters are summarized and interrelated in 
chapter 7, followed by final remarks in chapter 8. 
 
A comment on the terminology used is necessary. The proper name of the 
ground of protection due to internal armed conflict enshrined in chapter 4 
section 2 of the Aliens’ Act, is currently ‘a person otherwise in need of pro-
tection’. This is suggested to be altered to ‘alternative protection’ when 
transposing the Qualification Directive. I, however, will consequently use 
the term of the Qualification Directive: subsidiary protection. This term can 
entail different grounds for protection. However as used in this thesis it is to 
be understood as the protection given to persons fleeing an internal or inter-
national conflict. 
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2 Background 
According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) about 80 
per cent of all victims of armed conflicts since the end of Second World 
War have been victims of internal armed conflicts.15 The concept of internal 
armed conflicts has consequently gained in importance in international law 
during the last decades. From being a field regarded as exclusively within 
the domestic affairs of states, internal armed conflicts have successively 
found its way into the scope of international regulation. IHL is the main 
scene where the concept is performing, but it is also existent in several other 
international treaties and conventions16. Furthermore, during the last decade 
it has been recognized in migration laws and policies of many European 
states, under the regime of subsidiary protection. IHL and migration law are 
intertwined, since armed conflicts logically forces or triggers people to 
leave their country. However, as legal fields, the two of them are clearly 
historically and contextually distinct categories of international law. 
 
2.1 What is International Humanitarian Law? 
Historically, the relation between states has been the focus of international 
law. Thus, ius in bello and IHL originally was developed in a context of 
inter- state conflicts. Conflicts within the territory of a state were considered 
to fall in the scope of the principle of absolute sovereignty over domestic 
affairs.17 However, towards the end of the 19th century internal armed con-
flicts gained interest as an international issue, due to recent horrors of such 
conflicts. The ICRC played a central role in influencing international law to 
entail also victims of internal armed conflicts, and their work of codifying 
the laws of war has had a tremendous impact on the evolution of IHL.18 
Common article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions19 imposed minimal hu-
manitarian considerations in non- international conflicts. But it was first in 
                                                 
15 ICRC, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating 
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 
1977. Introduction., <www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO/475>, visited on 2008-01-28 
16 For example in article 8 (2)(d) of the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court of 
17 July 1998, A/CONF.183/9. The term ‘internal conflicts’ is furthermore a ground of 
protection in Central America, according to III(3) of the Cartagena Declaration on Refu-
gees, Colloquium on the International Protection of Refugees in Central America, Mexico 
and Panama, adopted on 22 November 1984. As for the Organization of African Unity, 
article 1(2) of the 1969 Convention governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in 
Africa, mentions “external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously 
disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality” as 
a ground of protection. 
17 L. Moir, The Law of Internal Armed Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), pp. 2-3 
18 Ibid., p. 21 
19 Geneva Conventions I, II, III and IV, adopted at Geneva, 12 of August 1949, 75 
U.N.T.S, p. 31; p. 58; p. 135; and p. 287 
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1977 by the adoption of Additional Protocol II20, that non- international 
conflicts clearly became in the ambit of international law. 
 
Contemporary IHL is a complex legal sphere of various conventions and 
rules of customary law, pertaining both to international and internal armed 
conflicts. One could wonder why internal armed conflicts are regulated on 
an international level at all, since they concern the domestic affairs of a 
state. There are of course several reasons for this, but mainly it is due to the 
fact that these conflicts tend to affect international peace and security when 
creating refugee flows or intruding on interests of third states. Furthermore, 
it is a consequence of the progressive development of human rights, confer-
ring rights to individuals under international law. 21  
 
2.2 What is Migration Law? 
Migration law is a diversified legal space. On an international level it is 
characterized by the principle of state sovereignty at one flank, and by com-
peting humanitarian principles on the other.22 Furthermore, it on one hand 
governs the relation between states23 and on other hand how states them-
selves are supposed to treat those seeking protection24. Protection of those 
fleeing armed conflicts or persecution is thereby regulated on an interna-
tional, regional as well as on a national level.25
 
Fleeing armed conflicts, civil wars or situations of generalized violence is 
recognized in international refugee law26 only if amounts to individualized 
persecution. The UNCHR Handbook27 states that persons fleeing interna-
tional or national armed conflicts are normally not considered as refugees, 
and highlights the fact that a well founded fear of persecution must be estab-
                                                 
20 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), adopted at Ge-
neva, 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S., p. 609 
21 ‘Civil Conflicts in Modern International Relations’ in Evan Luard (ed.), The Interna-
tional Regulation of Civil Wars, (London: Thames and Hudson, 1972), pp 7-25 at p. 20; L. 
Moir, The Law of Internal Armed Conflict (2002), p. 2 
22 G.S Goodwin- Gill & J. McAdam, The Refugee in International Law, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 3rd edition 2007), pp. 1- 3 
23 As an example, state practice suggests a general principle of duty to not create refugee 
flows and duty of cooperation if such flows arise. See generally G.S Goodwin- Gill & J. 
McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (2007), pp. 1-5 
24 Eg. the principle of non- refoulement. See generally G.S Goodwin- Gill & J. McAdam, 
The Refugee in International Law (2007), pp. 1-5 
25 G.S Goodwin- Gill & J. McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (2007), p. 7 
26 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted at Geneva on July 28, 1951, 189 
U.N.T.S., p. 150 [hereinafter the Refugee Convention]; and Protocol Relating to the Status 
of Refugees, adopted at New York on January 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S., p. 267 
27 UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under 
the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 1 January 
1992. Online. UNHCR Refworld, available at <www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid=3ae6b3314>,  visited on 2008-01-28 [hereinafter 
UNCHR Handbook] 
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lished in every individual case.28 Considering this lack of protection in in-
ternational refugee law, the term of internal armed conflicts instead has 
found its way into the definition of subsidiary protection within EU- law 
and in several domestic legal systems. Subsidiary protection entails legal 
status of persons who do not achieve refugee status, but nonetheless are 
regarded as in need of protection due to eg. armed conflict, risk of torture or 
death penalty.29 In 1997 internal armed conflicts was introduced in the 
Swedish Aliens’ Act, as a requisite for status as ‘ a person otherwise in need 
of protection’. In 2004 the European Council introduced the concept as a 
ground under the subsidiary protection regime of the Qualification Direc-
tive. Consequently, the concept of internal armed conflicts can be consid-
ered a vital part of European and Swedish migration law. 
 
2.3 The Relationship Between International Hu-
manitarian Law and Migration Law 
The relationship between international humanitarian law and migration law 
is an issue that still leaves much untold. However, one could roughly divide 
the relation between them into three different aspects. Firstly, IHL and mi-
gration law could be seen as applying concurrently, when people in need of 
protection are caught up in armed conflicts, since these persons can be refu-
gees and victims of conflict at the same time. Secondly, IHL and migration 
law can apply consecutively in situations when victims of conflict find 
themselves to be forced to leave the country of origin, because they do not 
receive adequate protection under IHL. The two fields of law in this case 
offer a continuum of protection. Finally, IHL may be seen as a source of 
inspiration for migration law, in the sense that the latter have imported con-
cepts, principles or rules from the former on a standard- setting and/or inter-
pretationary level. One example is a cardinal principle of IHL, the principle 
of distinction, which in refugee law imbues the concept of the exclusively 
civilian character of asylum.30 Another example is the concept dealt with in 
this thesis; the concept of internal armed conflicts. 
 
                                                 
28 UNCHR Handbook paras. 164-166 
29 Cf. Article 15 of the Qualification Directive 
30 S. Jaquemet, ‘The Cross-fertilization of International Humanitarian Law and Interna-
tional Refugee Law’, International Review of the Red Cross, (2001) Vol. 83, No. 843, pp. 
651-674 at p. 652 
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3 The Concept of Internal 
Armed Conflicts de Lege Lata 
3.1 Determination on the Existence of Conflicts 
There is no international authority determining the nature of armed con-
flicts. Different bodies make determinations for different purposes and with 
different consequences. 
 
Firstly, a decision of the Security Council on the existence of a threat to 
peace, breach of peace or act of aggression may be regarded as indirect evi-
dence of an armed conflict. The decision is not on the existence of armed 
conflicts per se, however resolutions recalling respect for the Geneva Con-
ventions has this implication, since the application of these require the exis-
tence of an armed conflict.31
 
Secondly, tribunals and courts, international as well as national, may have to 
make a determination on the nature of a conflict. For example, when indi-
viduals are tried for criminal responsibility of violations of international 
humanitarian laws, such assessments must be made.32 In national courts the 
determination is of relevance inter alia for the application of subsidiary pro-
tection in migration law. 
 
Thirdly, NGOs and international organizations may make such determina-
tions in course of their work and activities. One such example is the ICRC. 
However, these findings are often non- public, only communicated with the 
parties involved, in order to remind them of their obligations under IHL.33 
Another example is academic projects like the Uppsala Conflict Data Pro-
ject, which follows ongoing conflicts in the world and then defines and ana-
lyzes them for research purposes. The author does not suggest the findings 
of NGOs and research projects as authoritative. The organisations and pro-
jects are established with specific aims and agendas, influencing definitions 
and conclusions. One should therefore be careful when using or analysing 
these. Nonetheless, considering the invaluable insights and experiences 
these specialized bodies can offer, their conclusions may serve as guide-
lines. 
 
Finally, the parties of the conflict themselves logically may decide on the 
nature of the situation they are in. Lacking any independent authority mak-
                                                 
31 ‘Humanitarian Law, Human Rights and Refugee Law – Three Pillars’ by the ICRC legal 
advisor Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, an official statement held at International Association of 
Refugee Law Judges world conference, Stockholm, 21-23 April 2005. Available at 
<www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/6T7G86>, visited on 2008-01-28 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
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ing binding decisions in these matters, this is the most common way of de-
termination of conflicts. This creates problems since it is rather unlikely that 
the parties to a conflict are either willing or even able to assess the situation 
objectively, and thus the application of IHL becomes discretionary.34
 
3.2 Concepts in International Law 
3.2.1 Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions 
Common article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions was the first regulation 
of non- international armed conflicts in black letter law. Quite uniquely all 
states of the world have signed and ratified the conventions, thus conferring 
universal application of article 3.35 Naturally, the Conventions largely cod-
ify international customary law. However, this is of poor significance in the 
interpretation of what constitutes an internal conflict, since article 3 define 
such conflicts only in the negative: 
 
“In the case of armed conflict not of an international character [my italics] occur-
ring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict 
shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions [. . . ]” 
 
Three separate criteria for application can be deduced from the wording: 
ratione loci, ratione personae and the existence of an armed conflict. The 
first criterion is rather simple, since the universal ratification of the 1949 
Conventions leaves little territory escaping its application. 
 
The second criterion is less clear. The wording ’each Party to the conflict’ 
implies the existence of at least two distinguishable parties. It is widely ac-
cepted that non- governmental groups are required to meet some kind of 
organisational level to define as a party, since the ordinary meaning of a 
party calls for more than just random looters or rioters. General consensus 
seems to suggest that the group must be organised to such an extent that 
they are able to carry out the obligations under article 3. This is contended 
to imply organisation along military lines, including a structure of responsi-
ble command and an authority in control.36
 
The third criterion, the existence of an armed conflict, is the most complex 
one due to the fact that there still is not any acknowledged definition of the 
term. At the Conference preceding the adoption of article 3 a list with cer-
tain conditions to be fulfilled was suggested in order to clarify the meaning 
                                                 
34 L. Moir, The Law of Internal Armed Conflict (2002), p. 45 
35 ICRC, State Parties to the Following International Humanitarian Law and Other Re-
lated Treaties as of 21-Jan-2008, 
<www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/(SPF)/party_main_treaties/$File/IHL_ 
and_other_related_Treaties.pdf>, visited on 2008-01-28 
36 L. Moir, The Law of Internal Armed Conflict (2002), p. 36 
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of ‘an armed conflict’. The list compromised inter alia, requirements of 
territorial control of the insurgents, recognition of belligerency and the in-
volvement of regular armed forces. The list was abandoned and it is dis-
puted whether it ever or at least nowadays can serve as anything else than 
examples of when an armed conflict occurs.37 It seems like the list requires 
more than actually may be deduced from the wording of article 3, thus it is 
unlikely to be authoritative.38
 
The wording of common article 3 is vague and open to interpretation, failing 
to actually define its scope of application; an ‘armed conflict not of an in-
ternational character’. This has proved to be counterproductive, since states 
in practice have shown themselves reluctant to apply the provision, trying to 
escape by simply denying the existence of an internal armed conflict in its 
wording.39 The International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) respective Rwanda (ICTR) have shed some light on its application 
in assessing the nature of these conflicts. 
 
In Prosecutor v. Tadić40 the Appeals Chamber of ICTY, in interpreting 
common article 3, held an armed conflict to exist: 
 
“whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed vio-
lence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between 
such groups within a State.”41
 
Apparently, the Chamber set a rather low threshold for application. There 
are no requirements of governmental involvement, of exercise of territorial 
control by the insurgents or of recognition of belligerency. Thus, the Con-
ference list mentioned above appears to be of no value.42 The definition 
provided by the Appeals Chamber has been referred to as authoritative in 
succeeding cases decided by ICTY.43
 
                                                 
37 L. Moir, The Law of Internal Armed Conflict (2002), pp. 34-35; J.S Pictet, The Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary 4, Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War, (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 
1958), p.36 
38 Cf. article 32 of Vienna Convention on the Law adopted at Vienna, 22 May of Treaties 
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S., p. 331. Preparatory works are in international law regarded only as a 
supplementary means of interpretation. 
39 L. Moir, The Law of Internal Armed Conflict (2002), p. 88 
40 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić a/k/a “Dule”, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the De-
fence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction of 2 October 1995, 35 ILM 32 
(1996). [hereinafter Tadić] 
41 Tadić para. 70 
42 L. Moir, The Law of Internal Armed Conflict (2002), p.43 
43 See Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić a/k/a “Dule”, Case IT-94-1-T, Judgement of 7 May 
1997, 36 ILM 908 (1997), at paras. 561-68; Prosecutor v. Delalić, Mucić, Delić and 
Landzo, Case IT-96-21-T, Judgement of 16 November 1998, at para. 183; Prosecutor v. 
Furundzija, Case IT-95-17/1-T, Judgement of 10 December 1998, 38 ILM 317 (1999), at 
para. 59 
 15
However, in a case decided by ICTR, Prosecutor v. Akayesu44 the Confer-
ence list was given more importance. Based on these criteria the Chamber 
suggested a test of evaluation when determining the existence of an internal 
conflict. The level of intensity of the battles and the level of organisation of 
the parties, were determined as the main elements in distinguishing internal 
armed conflicts from mere disturbances.45 The Chamber underlined that this 
test is not dependent on the subjective judgement of the parties, but should 
be based on objective criteria.46
 
Even though these statements by the Tribunals might offer some guidance 
on the interpretation of article 3 still, as noted by ICTR, 
 
“the definition of an armed conflict per se is termed in the abstract, and whether or 
not a situation can be described as an ‘armed conflict’, meeting the criteria of Com-
mon Article 3, is to be decided upon on a case-by-case basis”47
 
Article 3 applies de facto, that is as soon as the criteria are meet with no 
regard to how the parties themselves define the situation.48 However, lack-
ing any enforcing international body it is mainly in the hands of the parties 
to a conflict to determine the nature of it. Thus, the concept of internal 
armed conflicts as enshrined in article 3 is inevitably within the discretion of 
the parties to recognize it as such.49
 
3.2.2 Article 1 of the 1977 Additional Protocol II 
The 1977 Additional Protocol II is the only international instrument dealing 
exclusively with non- international conflicts. It has been formally accepted 
by 163 states50, but it is disputed whether all provisions have yet hardened 
into customary law51. The main drawback of the Protocol is that state prac-
                                                 
44 Prosecutor v. Jean- Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement of 2 September 
1998, 37 ILM 13 99 (1998) [hereinafter Akayesu] 
45 Akayesu, paras. 619- 620 
46 Ibid., paras. 603 and 624 
47 Prosecutor v. George Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgement of 6 December 
1999, 39 ILM 557 (2000), at para. 93 
48 J.S Pictet, The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary 4, Convention 
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1958), p. 1353 
49 L.C. Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict, (Manchester: Manchester Uni-
versity Press, 2nd edition, 2000) p. 64; C.J Greenwood, Essays on War in International 
Law, (London: Cameron May, 2006) p. 125; L. Moir, The Law of Internal Armed Conflict 
(2002), pp. 34 and 45,  
50 ICRC, State Parties to the Following International Humanitarian Law and Other Re-
lated Treaties as of 21-Jan-2008, 
<www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/(SPF)/party_main_treaties/$File/IHL_ 
and_other_related_Treaties.pdf>, visited on 2008-01-28 
51 See for example C.J Greenwood, Essays on War in International Law (2006), pp. 198- 
199; and J-M Henckaerts, ‘ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law’ in 
International Review of the Red Cross, (2005) Vol. 87, No. 857, pp. 175-212. Either way, 
it seems like article 1 do not reflect customary law 
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tice offers little guidance because most states involved in internal conflicts 
since 1977, have not yet ratified the Protocol.52
 
According to the first passage of article 1, the Protocol is meant to develop 
and supplement article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The scope of 
application is: 
 
“all armed conflicts /…/ which take place in the territory of a High Contracting 
Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed 
groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its 
territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations 
and to implement this Protocol.”53
 
It explicitly does not apply to wars of national liberation or situations of 
internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts 
of violence and other acts of a similar nature.54
 
The wording of article 1 requires several elements for application. Firstly 
the conflict must involve governmental armed forces, and thus conflicts 
comprising only irregular forces or non- governmental groups fighting each 
other, are excluded. It is not clear what is meant by ‘armed forces’; whether 
it entails just regular military entities, or also national guards, police forces 
and customs.55 As under common article 3, there is at least a requirement of 
responsible command.56
 
Secondly, the opposing party must have de facto control of at least some 
part of the state territory. The control must be stable and extensive enough 
to allow the performance of sustained and concerted military operations; 
that is continuous and persistent acts in accordance with a strategic plan. 
Thus modern warfare, like guerrilla fighting and terrorism, implying fre-
quent mobility and long-term but sporadic acts, are excluded. This criterion 
has been much criticized, since the implied required degree of intensity and 
                                                 
52 C.J Greenwood, Essays on War in International Law (2006), p. 203; L. Moir, The Law of 
Internal Armed Conflict (2002), p.120 
53 Article 1(1) 
54 Article 1(1) and 1(2). Wars of national liberation are defined as international conflicts, 
covered by the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, adopted at Geneva, 8 
June 1977 1125 U.N.T.S., p. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I]. The implications of this will be 
dealt with in chapter 4.2.2 
55 The doctrine is somewhat divergent. Pilloud et al. argue that the term should be inter-
preted in the broadest sense, see Pilloud et al. Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 
June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, (Geneva: International Commit-
tee of the Red Cross 1987), paras. 4460 and 4462). Moir on the other hand seem to suggest 
that only entities with military structures are included and support his conclusion with 
statements in the preparatory works, where several delegates opposed the inclusion of po-
lice forces. See L. Moir, The Law of Internal Armed Conflict (2002), pp. 104-105 
56 L. Moir, The Law of Internal Armed Conflict (2002), p. 105 
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duration of the conflict suggests that only situations resembling interna-
tional wars are included.57
 
The final criterion, that the opposing party must be able to implement the 
provisions of the Protocol (inter alia to care and search for wounded and 
sick) further supports this contention. In order to fulfil this requirement the 
opposing party must have established some kind of infrastructure. Conse-
quently, the material application of the Protocol seems to be triggered only 
when the opposing force has established some kind of de facto government 
over some part of the state territory.58
 
In comparison with common article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 
Protocol gives a narrower and more restrictive definition of internal armed 
conflicts.59 The definition is more concrete but provides for such conditions 
that only intense and large- scale conflicts are included.60 Thus, many or 
most contemporary internal conflicts, including high mobility and guerrilla 
warfare, would fail to fulfil its requirements. 61
 
This entails that the relationship of the Protocol to common article 3 be-
comes very important. If the former is meant to supersede the latter, then 
many (or most) conflicts would be left unregulated in international law. At 
the Diplomatic Conference preceding the adoption of the Protocol, many 
delegates contended that eventually common article 3 and the Protocol 
would converge, by state practice redefining the application of article 3 up 
to the threshold of the Protocol. However, to this date there is not much evi-
dence supporting such a development in state practice.62 Thus, a reasonable 
conclusion would be that common article 3 and Protocol II are intended to 
apply to different type of conflicts and thereby as operating complementary. 
Common article 3 ensures minimum protection in any non- international 
conflict, while Protocol II provides more extensive humanitarian rules in 
internal conflicts resembling international wars.63
 
3.2.3 Recent Developments in International Humanitar-
                                                 
57 L.C. Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict (2000), pp.66-67; L. Moir, The 
Law of Internal Armed Conflict (2002), p. 105-106 
58 L.C. Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict (2000), pp. 66-67 and 321; L. 
Moir, The Law of Internal Armed Conflict (2002), p. 106 
59 L. Moir, The Law of Internal Armed Conflict (2002), p.101; Pilloud et al. Commentary 
on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 
(1987), paras 4456-4457 
60 L.C. Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict (2000), pp.66-67; L. Moir, The 
Law of Internal Armed Conflict (2002), p.101 
61 L.C. Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict (2000), pp. 66-67; F. Kalshoven 
Constraints on the Waging of War, (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 
1987), p. 138; L. Moir, The Law of Internal Armed Conflict (2002), p. 106 
62 L. Moir, The Law of Internal Armed Conflict (2002), pp. 101- 103 
63 Pilloud et al. Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949 (1987), p. 1350, L. Moir, The Law of Internal Armed Con-
flict (2002), pp. 101-103 
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ian Law 
Since the end of the Cold War in 1989, IHL has undergone progressive de-
velopments.64 One of these has been the assimilation of the law of non- in-
ternational conflicts with the law of international conflicts; the historically 
sharp distinction between them has gradually faded.65
 
This trend began in the Nicaragua66 judgement by the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) and was consolidated in the Tadić decision by ICTY. In Nica-
ragua the ICJ held common article 3 as ‘a minimum yardstick’ applicable in 
any armed conflict.67 Thus, the ICJ recognized that some fundamental rules 
of humanitarian law are applicable no matter what type of conflict is at 
hand.68 In the Tadić decision the ICTY concluded that many rules previ-
ously applicable only in international conflicts, now have become custom-
ary rules applicable equally in internal conflicts. It seems like states have 
began to abandon their reluctance, pervading in 1949 and 1977, towards 
regulation of internal armed conflicts.69 The ICTY noticed in Tadić: “[a] 
sovereignty-oriented approach has been gradually supplanted by a human- 
being- oriented approach.”70
 
Thus, the reality of modern armed conflicts seems to have rendered the legal 
distinction between different kinds of armed conflicts as irrelevant.71 Con-
sequently, most humanitarian law treaties concluded since 1995 applies to 
international as well as internal conflicts.72 However, it is still premature to 
conclude that the distinction between international and internal conflicts has 
vanished per se. It appears like IHL is heading in that direction, but state 
practice is still not sufficient or clear enough to confirm this trend as cus-
tomary law.73
 
                                                 
64 D. Schindler, ‘International Humanitarian Law: Its Remarkable Development and its 
Persistent Violation’, Journal of the History of International Law, (2003), Vol. 5 No. 2, pp. 
165-188 at p. 174 
65 M.N Shaw, International Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 5th edition, 
2003), p. 1069; D. Schindler, ‘International Humanitarian Law: Its Remarkable Develop-
ment and its Persistent Violation’ (2003), p. 176 
66 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judge-
ment on 27 of June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, at p. 392 [hereinafter Nicaragua]  
67 Ibid., para. 218 
68 M.N Shaw, International Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 5th edition, 
2003), p. 1069; D. Schindler, ‘International Humanitarian Law: Its Remarkable Develop-
ment and its Persistent Violation’ (2003), p. 176 
69 D. Schindler, ‘International Humanitarian Law: Its Remarkable Development and its 
Persistent Violation’ (2003), p. 177 
70 Tadić, para. 97 
71 Ibid.,, paras. 97-98 
72 Inter alia the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court of July 1998. For an ex-
haustive enumeration, see D. Schindler, ‘International Humanitarian Law: Its Remarkable 
Development and its Persistent Violation’ (2003), p. 177 note 51 
73 See for example J. Kellenberger ‘International Humanitarian Law and Other Legal Re-
gimes: Interplay in Situations of Violence’, International Review of the Red Cross, (2003) 
Vol. 85, No. 851, pp. 645-653 at pp. 645-646 
 19
In the academic debate the gradation of different regulation for different 
conflicts has been pointed out as meaningless for decades.74 The distinction 
begs difficult questions of origins, status and character of conflicts and par-
ticipants. This is obvious from the jurisprudence of ICTY, trying to define 
the highly complex and inconstant situation in former Yugoslavia. It is ar-
gued that a uniform law of conflicts, independent of distinction between 
international and internal war would solve these intricate issues.75  
 
It is not only the distinction between international and internal conflicts that 
is being criticised amongst international jurists, but furthermore the rele-
vance of the traditional view on internal conflicts. The traditional view is 
based on the assumption that internal conflicts comprise armed forces, 
clearly distinguishable from civilians, under responsible command and 
skilled in conduct of hostilities. However, nowadays conflicts are mainly 
fought by private groups lacking any clear structure and training in the con-
duct of war. Thus, the black letter law appears anachronic. The greatest 
problem of IHL will thereby be to deal with the blurred concepts of contem-
porary conflicts and, in particular, the fading distinction of combatants and 
non- combatants.76 This will be further dealt with in chapter 5. 
 
3.3 Concepts in EU- law 
The Qualification Directive seeks to harmonize the domestic complemen-
tary protection of the EU member states. Complementary or subsidiary pro-
tection includes all persons that do not fit within the legal definition of refu-
gees, as enshrined in the Refugee Convention, but who nevertheless has a 
valid need of protection. Article 2(e) defines these persons as: 
 
“a third country national or a stateless person who does not qualify as a refugee but 
in respect of whom substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the per-
son concerned, if returned to his or her country of origin, or in the case of a stateless 
person, to his or her country of former habitual residence, would face a real risk of 
suffering serious harm as defined in Article 15 /.../and is unable, or, owing to such 
risk, unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country” 
 
Serious harm is in article 15 inter alia defined as:  
 
“(c) serious and individual threat to a civilian's life or person by reason of indis-
criminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict.” 
 
Paragraph (c) is meant to reflect the consistent but varied state practice of 
the member states, to grant some kind of complementary protections to per-
                                                 
74 E. Crawford, ‘Unequal before the Law: The Case for the Elimination of the Distinction 
between International and Non-international Armed Conflicts’, Leiden Journal of Interna-
tional Law (2007) Vol. 20 No. 2, pp. 441-465 at p. 450 
75 E. Crawford, ‘Unequal before the Law: The Case for the Elimination of the Distinction 
between International and Non-international Armed Conflicts’ (2007), p. 464 
76 D. Schindler, ‘International Humanitarian Law: Its Remarkable Development and its 
Persistent Violation’ (2003), p. 182 
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sons fleeing violations of human rights and other indiscriminate effects of 
armed conflicts, when a specific link to the Refugee Convention grounds is 
lacking.77 The provision sets a rather high threshold since an individual 
threat is required.78
 
In the drafting of the paragraph it was suggested that a reference to the 1949 
Geneva Convention III should be included. If this had been finalised, it 
would have been clear that only armed conflicts as defined in IHL would 
have been encompassed by the provision. Since the reference was aban-
doned in the final draft, the subsidiary protection in article 15(c) cannot be 
concluded to be linked solely to IHL.79
 
Partly article 15(c) reproduces the member states’ obligations under the 
Temporary Protection Directive80. The latter is more generous in scope than 
the former, since it includes all armed conflicts and also systematic or gen-
eralized violations of human rights.81 There seem to be a tacit recognition 
that protection is more easily obtained under the Temporary Protection Di-
rective than under article 15(c). Hence, the individual continuously receive 
at least temporary protection for as long as it is valid, even though an appli-
cation for asylum has been filed and denied. However, the regime of tempo-
rary protection is circumscribed by a built-in trigger mechanism: it only 
applies after a decision by the EU Council. Thus, its application can be (in-
directly) controlled and restricted by the member states. The Qualification 
Directive on the other hand applies to anyone within the jurisdiction fulfill-
ing the criteria for article 15.82 This might explain the more cautious and 
restrictive wording in the latter. 
 
The concept of internal armed conflicts lacks a common understanding 
across the member states. A recent UNHCR study of the impact of the 
Qualification Directive in five member states, shows that there are divergent 
interpretations and applications in for example France, Slovakia and Swe-
den. In Sweden the conflict in Chechnya was regarded as an internal armed 
conflict, while the Slovakian authorities did not recognize it as such. The 
situation of Iraq has been defined as an internal conflict by French authori-
ties, while in Sweden only as a ‘grave’ conflict. UNHCR express concerns 
in their recommendations, that a restrictive approach in some member states 
                                                 
77 G.S Goodwin- Gill & J. McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (2007), pp. 326-
327 
78 J. McAdam, ‘The European Union Qualification Directive: The Creation of a Subsidiary 
Protection Regime’, p. 481 
79 Ibid., p. 485 
80 Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving tempo-
rary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promot-
ing a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the 
consequences thereof, Official Journal L 212 of 7 August 2001, pp. 12-33 [hereinafter 
Temporary Protection Directive] 
81 Article 2(c) of the Temporary Protection Directive  
82 G.S Goodwin- Gill & J. McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (2007), pp. 327-
329; J. McAdam, ‘The European Union Qualification Directive: The Creation of a Subsidi-
ary Protection Regime’, (2005), p. pp. 486- 487 
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can imply the denial of subsidiary protection to persons who indeed face a 
real risk of serious harm in their country of origin. The UNHCR conse-
quently request for amendment of article 15(c), so that it is not limited to 
international and internal situations only.83 
 
3.4 Concepts in the Swedish Aliens’ Act 
The Qualification Directive has not yet been formally transposed into the 
Swedish legislation. However, in 2004 a governmental inquiry (hereinafter 
the Inquiry) consisting of a group of experts in the field of migration, was 
assigned to review amendments necessary in order to transpose the Direc-
tive. In January 2006 the Inquiry presented a comprehensive report84 with 
suggestions for legislative changes. Nonetheless, at the time of writing this 
thesis, no Governmental proposal has yet been finalized. Thus, the report 
from 2006 is the only document so far giving any guidance as how the Di-
rective is going to be transposed into Swedish legislation.85
 
In line with the minimalist approach of the Inquiry’s report,86 the Inquiry 
concluded the existing provision in chapter 4 section 2 of the Swedish 
Aliens’ Act to be sufficient enough to transpose article 15(c) of the Direc-
tive. However, for the sake of clarification and to safeguard the more fa-
vourable approach in the pre- existing provision, chapter 4 section 2 is sug-
gested to be amended as87: 
 
“A person in need of alternative protection according to this law is an alien who /…/ 
is outside the country in which the alien is a citizen, but where there are reasonable 
grounds to assume that the alien upon return 
/…/ 
2. would as a civilian run a serious and individual risk to life or person by reason of 
indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict, 
3. would otherwise be in need of protection due to international or internal armed 
conflict, or would risk to be exposed to serious violations due to other grave con-
flicts in the alien’s home country, or 
/…/ 
                                                 
83 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Asylum in the European Union. A Study of the 
Implementation of the Qualification Directive, November 2007. Online. UNHCR Ref-
world, available at <www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid=473050632>, visited on 2008-01-28, at pp. 11-15 
84 Skyddsgrundsdirektivet och Svensk Rätt. En Anpassning av Svensk Lagstiftning till EG-
direktiv 2004/83/EG Angående Flyktingar och Andra Skyddsbehövande, SOU 2006:6, 19 
January 2007 (available with English summary at <www.regeringen.se/sb/d/108/a/56440>, 
visited on 2008-01-28)[hereinafter SOU 2006:6]
85 G. Noll ‘The Qualification Directive and its Transposition in Swedish Law’ in Karin 
Zwaan (ed.), The Qualification Directive: Central Themes, Problem Issues and Implemen-
tation in Selected Member States, (Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2007), pp. 79-86 at p. 
80 
86 Ibid., p. 80 
87 SOU 2006:6 pp. 164-165 
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and that alien is unable or, owing to such risk, unwilling to accord himself or herself 
of the protection of that country.”88
 
The concept of armed conflicts is not elaborated by the Inquiry, but refer-
ence is made to statements in preceding preparatory works and case- law 
concerning the definition of subsidiary protection, as enshrined in current 
chapter 4 section 2 of the Aliens’ Act. Thus, the transposition of article 
15(c) is not intended to modify the existing application.89
 
Internal armed conflicts as a ground for subsidiary protection was intro-
duced for the first time in the Aliens’ Act in 1997. This aimed at codifying 
and clarifying already existing practice on giving protection to persons flee-
ing international and civil wars on humanitarian reasons.90 During the first 
half of the 90s, people fleeing the conflicts in Somalia and Bosnia- Herze-
govina were granted such ‘humanitarian protection’. The decisive factors 
when determining the existence of an internal conflict were that no near 
solution to the conflict could be anticipated; that the general situation was 
such that the civilian population was not satisfactorily protected by the state 
from the battles; and that the circumstances was such so it would seem in-
humane to send the person back.91
 
In the preparatory works of the provision introduced in 1997, the Govern-
ment noted that at the time the incomparable largest category of persons 
granted resident permits on some kind of refugee related basis, were people 
fleeing war and civil war. The need for protection in these cases was held to 
be strong, at least temporary, since the armed conflict from where the per-
sons concerned have fled could be so intense, that a return to that country 
appeared as unthinkable. This would especially be the case when the alter-
native of internal flight was inapplicable. It was concluded to be compelling 
reasons for introducing a new provision on protection, aiming at this cate-
gory of persons.92 The provision was, in content, identical to chapter 4 sec-
tion 2 as quoted above. The preparatory works do not provide any further 
guidance on how internal armed conflicts are to be defined, nor does it refer 
to any relevant international instruments. This has instead to be sought in 
subsequent case- law. 
 
The situation of Chechnya was in 2004 regarded as an internal armed con-
flict by the Government, in deciding upon an application for protection by 
                                                 
88 SOU 2006:6 p.44, in translation of G. Noll ‘The Qualification Directive and its Transpo-
sition in Swedish Law’ (2007), p. 82 
89 SOU 2006:6, p. 165 
90 Government proposal Svensk Migrationspolitik i Globalt Perspektiv, Prop. 1996/97:25, 
20 September 1996 [hereinafter Prop. 1996/97:25], at pp. 99-100  
91 See Government proposal Med Förslag till Utlänningslag m.m., Prop. 1988/89:86, 16 
March 1989 at p. 147; case- law regarding Somalia: Reg. 25-93 (1993-06-21) and Reg. 26-
93 (1993-06-21); case- law regarding Bosnia- Herzegovina: Reg. 11-94 (1994-03-17) and 
Reg. 13-94 (1994-03-17). All cases recited in H. Sandesjö & K. Björk Utlänningsärdenden 
– Praxis: Utlänningsnämndens och Regeringens Beslut i Urval, (Stockholm:Fritze 1995), 
pp. 569-572 and pp. 755-758 
92 Prop. 1996/97:25, pp. 99-100 
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two Chechnyan nationals93. In their grounds of decision, the Government 
stated that the situation of the civilians in Chechnya was uncertain and se-
vere, since both the Russian army and the Chechnyan rebels were guilty of 
serious violations of human rights in the regions. However the applicants 
did not qualify as refugees, since a link to a specific refugee ground was 
lacking. In referring to internal armed conflicts as characterized in interna-
tional law, such conflicts were concluded to comprise strives between a 
state’s regular armed forces and other organized armed parties, which ex-
ceed situations of internal disturbances or sporadic or isolated acts of vio-
lence. The opposing armed party was considered to necessarily possess 
some kind of territorial control in the sense that they can perform military 
operations. The Government then argued that the application of the provi-
sion in the Aliens’ Act could provide for both a more restrictive and a wider 
interpretation of internal armed conflict, than the one stipulated by interna-
tional law. The decisive factors were concluded to be how intense the con-
flict is and thus to what extent the civilians are affected by it. 
 
The criteria set in the case of Chechnya were reaffirmed by the Migration 
Court of Appeal in three cases94 concerning the situation of Iraq in 2007, 
however with the opposite outcome. The Court considered the circum-
stances to be severe, but failing to meet the requirements of an internal 
armed conflict in the meaning of international law and chapter 4 section 2 of 
the Aliens’ Act. The Court did not refer to any actual facts on the situation 
of Iraq, but simply stated that there currently exists no internal armed con-
flict. 
 
3.5 Assessment and Conclusions 
The Swedish concept of internal armed conflicts, as developed in case- law, 
refers to ‘internal armed conflicts in the meaning of international law’. As is 
quite apparent from the above examination of the core instruments of IHL, 
this reference seems rather empty. One cannot conclude there to be any uni-
form or accepted definition of internal armed conflicts in international law. 
The definitions of common article 3, Additional Protocol II and relevant 
jurisprudence all suggest for different interpretations of the concept. 
 
Common article 3 offers a wide ranging but vague definition. Neither terri-
torial control nor the involvement by the Government seems to be required. 
Although the list of criteria mentioned in the preparatory works would de-
limit its scope, it is questionable whether this list could be considered as 
anything else than guidelines or examples of when internal conflicts are at 
hand. In contrast to common article 3, article 1(1) of Protocol II provide for 
a very narrow concept, requiring territorial control and a high level of or-
ganisation of the opposing party. Seemingly, only large- scale conflicts fall 
within its scope. 
                                                 
93 Reg. 99-04 (2004-02-19) 
94 UM 23- 06 (2007-02-26), UM 1140- 06 (2007-05-23) and UM 837-06 (2007-06-15) 
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To this date we are lacking any relevant jurisprudence from ICJ on the defi-
nition of internal armed conflicts. Although the Tribunals of former Yugo-
slavia and Rwanda have shed some light on the issue, one should be some-
what careful in drawing conclusions upon these. These Tribunals were es-
tablished in their each very specific context, with the primary aim to settle 
criminal responsibility of individuals. Either way, even though the Tribunals 
may have contributed greatly to the understanding of customary law and of 
the content of IHL, their conclusions upon determination of internal con-
flicts still leaves much untold. 
 
In sum, it is evident from the examination of IHL that there exists no ac-
cepted or coherent understanding of the term internal armed conflict. As 
previously contended, this implies that the application of common article 3 
and Protocol II in the end becomes dependent upon the will of the fighting 
parties to recognize the situation as an internal conflict. And because both 
the instruments allows for different interpretations, there is plenty of room 
for discretion. 
 
Since migration law bases its concept of armed conflicts upon IHL, the in-
coherency and the built- in margin of discretion of the latter is passed on to 
the application of subsidiary protection. The ambiguous practice pertaining 
to the Qualification Directive reflects this well. As is apparent from the 
UNHCR study the interpretation of internal armed conflicts in the EU mem-
ber states is divergent. This has several implications. One side of the coin, 
as UNHCR recognizes, is that the application of the Qualification Directive 
is unforeseeable and discretionary, and thus in danger of disregarding per-
sons that indeed are in need of protection. The other side of the coin is the 
high stake gambling of ‘asylum shopping’.95 Naturally, people in flight will 
seek themselves to states with the most potential of granting protection. This 
is inevitably counterproductive, since liberal states most probably will re-
strict their policy collaterally as their welfare systems are strained. The 
changing policy of the Swedish authorities towards Iraqi asylum seekers 
could be indicating such an outcome. 
 
It is in any case, as the previous examination has shown, far from evident 
what the Swedish interpretation of the concept of internal armed conflicts 
actually entails. It is clear that it is based on international law, but only im-
plicit is one able to derive the source of law providing the base. Since terri-
torial control and governmental involvement clearly are requirements, it 
appears as the Swedish interpretation resembles the definition of internal 
conflicts as laid down in Protocol II. Thus, a rather narrow approach is ap-
                                                 
95 This phenomenon is for example recognized in another UNHCR report, concerning asy-
lum policies of the EU member states towards Iraqi applicants. See UNHCR, Fortress 
Europe and the Iraqi 'intruders': Iraqi asylum-seekers and the EU, 2003-2007 by Markus 
Sperl, Research Paper No. 144 October 2007. Online: New Issues in Refugee Research, 
available from: <www.unhcr.org/doclist/research/3bbc18ed5.html>, visited on 2008-01-28
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plied. These criteria have however been somewhat adapted to the elements 
of the law of migration. 
 
The preparatory works mentions the fact that a conflict could be of such 
intensity that it would seem unthinkable to send the applicant concerned 
back to the country of origin, while the possibilities of internal flight are 
non- existent. From this rather vague statement at least a degree of intensity 
can be concluded to be required. The examination of the jurisprudence gives 
a somewhat scattered image of what this actually means. 
 
In cases predating the introduction of the concept into the Aliens’ Act, em-
phasis is on the general situation of the civilian population and on the fact 
that no near solution of the conflict is foreseeable. Since it was this case- 
law the provision introduced in 1997 aimed at codifying, one could presume 
that these criteria remain relevant. While the solution of the conflict is not 
mentioned by subsequent jurisprudence, the situation of the civilian popula-
tion is confirmed by the Chechnyan and the Iraqi cases, thus undoubtedly an 
important factor. 
 
However, there seem to be divergent approaches. In the Chechnyan case it 
is expressly stated that internal armed conflict in the Aliens’ Act can be in-
terpreted as either wider or narrower than in international law, and that the 
decisive factor must be how the civilian population is affected. Thus, it 
seems that the crucial element is the effect on the people of the country, 
rather than the fulfilment of criteria as laid down in Protocol II. In the Iraqi 
case this is somewhat altered. The Court considers that the situation of the 
civilian population furthermore is a decisive criterion. Hence, it appears as 
if the Court applies the criteria identical to the ones of Protocol II and the 
criterion of affected civilian population cumulatively. If this is the case, the 
concept of internal armed conflicts as defined in the Iraqi cases, is even nar-
rower than Protocol II. 
 
However, it might be precipitous to draw such a conclusion. In general it is 
hard to draw any conclusions at all regarding the interpretation of internal 
armed conflicts from the existing jurisprudence. As is striking when exam-
ining these cases, it is impossible to distinguish the actual circumstances 
which the Government/Court relies on in determining the status of respec-
tive conflicts. The specific situation of neither Chechnya nor Iraq is explic-
itly evaluated. Thus, one cannot really grasp the rationale behind determin-
ing Chechnya as an internal armed conflict, and Iraq as not. 
 
In conclusion, the incoherency and built- in discretion identified in IHL 
seemingly infects the interpretation of internal conflicts when applied in 
migration law. What is rather remarkable is that this ‘import’ from IHL 
takes place without further deliberation. As regards the Swedish Aliens’ 
Act, one cannot find any reflections, neither in preparatory works nor in 
case- law, upon the fact that the concept used is taken from a completely 
different sphere of law; the specific context in which the term of armed con-
flicts originally operates is simply ignored. Consequently the flaws of the 
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concept in IHL are unnoticeably transmitted when applying subsidiary pro-
tection. Furthermore, since it is not clear in concrete terms what distin-
guishes an internal armed conflict from other conflicts, the interpretation 
becomes discretionary. Subsidiary protection on this ground is hence, in the 
eyes of the applicant, legally uncertain. 
Interestingly, if one takes into account the most recent developments in IHL 
and pertaining academic debate, IHL seems to be moving towards a uniform 
law of all armed conflicts. The differentiation between international and 
internal conflicts is already in decline, and furthermore the relevance of the 
classic notion of internal armed conflicts is being questioned. This is at least 
implicitly indicated by the wide interpretation of armed conflicts as pre-
sented in Tadić. Even though these developments so far are only true in 
style and not supported by state practice, it is interesting in comparison with 
the evolution of migration law. Because in the latter field of law, the devel-
opment takes the opposite direction: distinctions of conflicts have become 
more and more consolidated. The Swedish Aliens’ Act now deals with no 
less than three different concepts of conflicts: international, internal and 
other grave ones.96 Thus, while distinctions of conflicts in IHL seem to be 
fading at the advantage of protection, they are becoming of increasingly 
importance in migration law as decisive factors for protection. Even though 
the notion of armed conflicts as used in migration law allegedly is to be 
based on the one of IHL, one can thereby predict a growing tension between 
these spheres of law. The fusion them between is in danger of turning into 
confusion. 
 
While this is left to the future, let’s take one step back and turn to the past, 
in order to find the origins of the failure in lex lata to coherently and ade-
quately define internal armed conflicts. This takes us back to the early days 
of IHL. 
                                                 
96 Chapter 4 section 2 point 2 of the Aliens’ Act, SFS (2005:716) 
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4 Historical Regulation of Inter-
nal Armed Conflicts 
The law of war arose from the customary regulation on the battlefield, as the 
combating parties applied equal status to each other. Hence, international 
law became an instrument of ensuring the same rights and obligations upon 
sovereign states when meeting arms against arms. Until the end of the 18th 
century the principle of state sovereignty prevailed, leaving any intra- state 
conflicts exclusively within the sphere of domestic law. However, in the 
work and theories of early international jurists, a new order emerged, intro-
ducing internal conflicts of a certain magnitude into the ambit of interna-
tional law.97 The historical process of this incorporation of domestic con-
flicts into international regulation stretches from the 18th century to the 
1970s. 
 
4.1 The Doctrine of Recognition of Belligerency 
“When a party is formed within the State which ceases to obey the sovereign and is 
strong enough to make a stand against him, or when a Republic is divided into two 
opposite factions, and both sides take up arms, there exists a civil war /.../ Although 
one of the two parties may have been wrong in breaking up the unity of the State 
and in resisting the lawful authority, still they are non the less divided in fact. /.../ 
That being so, it is perfectly clear that the established laws of war/.../should be ob-
served on both sides in a civil war.”98
 
In these words by the 18th century legal philosopher Vattel one can distin-
guish the birth of recognition of belligerency99; the doctrine that introduced 
the international regulation of internal armed conflicts. In practice this doc-
trine emerged in the beginning of the 19th century, during the conflicts in the 
Spanish- American colonies.100
 
The traditional international law then recognized three different stages of 
domestic armed challenges against the established authority of a state: rebel-
lion, insurgency and belligerency.101
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Rebellions were small-scale or sporadic internal disorders. As long as these 
uprisings could be handled effectively within the domestic security system, 
they fell outside the ambit of international regulation. A more extensive 
attack, amounting to a real potential threat to the state government, was de-
fined as insurgency. Then foreign states had to recognize the situation in 
order to protect and regulate affected political and economical interests, and 
furthermore to ensure humane conduct of combat. Recognising an insur-
gency did not trigger any belligerent rights but certain international rules, 
mainly in the sphere of maritime law. 102
 
Belligerency was the final stage of internal conflicts, dependent upon the 
recognition by third state(s) or by the state under attack itself. Such recogni-
tion brought the entire ius in bello into effect, conferring equal belligerent 
rights and duties upon both the parties and furthermore activating the prin-
ciple of neutrality upon third states.103 Before any recognition was legiti-
mate certain requirements had to be met. Firstly, the conflict needed to esca-
late from a mere local rebellion to a situation similar to an inter- state war, 
involving a considerable part of the population. Secondly, the rebels had to 
control and govern a substantial part of the national territory. Thirdly, the 
rebels had to become organised as armed forces under responsible com-
mand, observing the laws of war. Lastly, the conflict had to have reached 
such a stage that it became a diplomatically or economically necessity for 
foreign states to acknowledge it as a civil war.104
 
These rather imprecise and subjective criteria left the act of recognition 
within the total discretion of states. Since the parent state logically was re-
luctant to limit their sovereignty unless it gained their own interest, recogni-
tion rarely took place. Similarly, foreign states quite rarely made use of this 
option, as this could be considered as a hostile act against the legitimate 
government in the conflict.105 Thus, while the above requirements opened 
the possibility of recognition of belligerency, state practice disaffirms that 
this was a duty in a legal sense. The impact of the doctrine of belligerency 
in the reality of international law was hence rather limited. While states 
seem to have accepted the fact that once recognition had taken place, the 
full panoply of ius in bello applied, the act of recognition itself rested on 
pure political or economical considerations, rather than on any legal obliga-
tion. Any humanitarian considerations therefore, were more of a fortunate 
consequence than the actual reason for applying the laws of war.106
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4.2 The Path of Common Article 3 and Additonal 
Protocol II 
By the mid 19th century, in line with the then prevailing trend of codifica-
tion, the laws of war were established in writing. Several international 
agreements and declarations were concluded (such as the Hague Conven-
tions), but they all dealt with international wars only. Although the doctrine 
of recognition of belligerency rapidly became obsolete, internal conflicts 
were left unregulated, resting only on the willingness of states to apply rele-
vant rules.107 When civil war broke out in Russia and Spain in 1918 respec-
tively 1936, the decline of recognizing belligerents became obvious: there 
was a persistent refusal of giving the belligerents any recognition, which 
resulted in a total disregard of the laws on war and disastrous humanitarian 
consequences.108
 
It appears as if the degeneration of the recognition of belligerency was sim-
ply ignored by states, appraising their sovereignty higher than humanitarian 
considerations in domestic conflicts. The further development of interna-
tional humanitarian law thus lent upon the influence of another actor: the 
ICRC. Although having no competence adopting any legally binding rules, 
their work of codifying laws of war has had a tremendous effect upon 
IHL.109 Already before First World War, the ICRC attempted to promote an 
international regulation of civil wars, but they met strong resistance 
amongst states, jealously guarding their domestic affairs from any interfer-
ence. It was after the horrors of the Spanish Civil War that the ICRC finally 
managed to put the regulation of internal conflicts on the IHL agenda.110 
The drafting process of common article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
began, but it was by no means an effortless process. 
 
4.2.1 The Drafting of Common Article 3 
No other issue was debated at such length as the content of article 3, in the 
preparatory conference preceding the adoption of the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions. From the start the delegates were divided into two different factions 
of opinion: those guarding state sovereignty and those favouring humani-
tarianism. The former group on the one hand, feared that a too wide or gen-
eral formulation of the concept of non- international conflicts, would protect 
individual rights at the expense of the right of states to repress domestic 
violence. Several delegates were concerned that the article would include all 
types of internal unrest such as anarchy, rebellion and banditry, and thus 
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forcing governments recognizing belligerent status and applying the laws of 
war to even the smallest groups of rebels. 
 
Those favouring humanitarianism on the other hand, supported the fact that 
common article 3 should confer as complete protection as possible, resem-
bling the protection provided in international wars. These delegates fur-
thermore suggested that what appears to be mere banditry, could be mani-
festations by groups fighting for independence and dignity, such as colo-
nized people. They argued that a wide interpretation of non- international 
conflicts did not necessarily impair the right of the de jure government to 
repression, if the application of the rules would not impinge on the legal 
status of the belligerents.111
 
Several drafts trying to reconcile the two positions, comprising both formal 
and factual criteria, were presented but rejected. It appeared to be only two 
available solutions: either to apply all the provisions of the Geneva Conven-
tions to a limited number of non- international conflict situations, or to ap-
ply a restricted number of humanitarian norms to all types of non- interna-
tional conflicts.112 A new draft was prepared based on the first alternative. 
Its application was dependent upon the formal requisite that the de jure gov-
ernment had recognized the opposing party as belligerents, or that the insur-
gents could be said to have the features of a belligerent force. This draft, as 
a number of subsequent ones, was strongly opposed.113
 
Finally in 1949 the draft corresponding to common article 3 as is stands 
today, was adopted by thirty-four votes against twelve, with one abstention. 
It appears to be based on the second alternative, in applying specific hu-
manitarian rules to all non- international conflicts, and thus comprising a 
’miniature convention’ itself within the Geneva Conventions.114 Crucial for 
the final adoption of the provision, was the introduction of a last passage 
stating: “The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the 
legal status of the Parties to the conflict”. This wording clearly confirms that 
application of article 3 does not constitute an act of recognition. In this way 
the guardians of sovereignty were assured that the provision would not in 
any way impair the rights of the de jure government.115
 
The final outcome of article 3 is clearly a compromise between the adher-
ents to state sovereignty and those to a humanitarian approach. The words 
of the Swiss delegate illustrates this rather well: “half a loaf is better than no 
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bread.”116. Notwithstanding the long process of drafting, it is important to 
acknowledge the fact that although disagreeing on the content, the states at 
least agreed upon the fact that protection were to be extended also to con-
flicts not of an international character. Thus the outcome should be seen as 
an act of consensus. 117
 
4.2.2 The Drafting of Additional Protocol II 
For many years, common article 3 was the only black letter law regulating 
internal armed conflicts. However, due to escalating numbers and intensity 
of internal conflicts in the context of decolonisation, the limitations of the 
minimum standard of the article became obvious.118 Again, the ICRC took 
the initiative of gathering a conference to draft new rules. One aim was to 
adopt a more detailed definition of ‘armed conflicts’, based on objective 
criteria. Again, the drafting process was dogged with controversy with the 
delegates split into two groups of different opinions: state sovereignty on 
the one hand, and humanitarianism on the other.119
 
However, the drafting of Protocol II was further ironically enough haunted 
by the achievements of Protocol I, adopted at the same conference. While 
the overall goal of the ICRC with drafting new rules was solely humanitar-
ian, several of the states participating in the conference came with a differ-
ent agenda in mind. Their goal was to achieve legitimacy of armed resis-
tance against colonial powers, and they suggested classification of conflicts 
according to the aim and objectives of the parties. Although the latter sug-
gestion remains controversial, these states were successful, and struggle 
against “colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist re-
gimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination”120 was decided as 
international wars, within the scope of Additional Protocol I. Following this 
accomplishment many delegations interest in drafting another Protocol, 
dealing solely with internal armed conflicts, faded.121 Consequently, the 
conference with the intended duration of one year, was prolonged for four 
years. 
 
At the one extreme were delegates opposing any (further) regulation of non- 
international conflicts at all. At the other were states supporting the initia-
tive that protection in international as well as internal conflicts should be 
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provided by the same rules.122 In comparison with the drafting of article 3, 
some new concerns were raised: that the adoption of Protocol II would in-
ternationalize internal problems and thus invite foreign interventions.123 A 
long process of drafting proposals to be rejected began, which do not need 
to be dealt with in detail here.124 The difficulties can be distinguished sim-
ply by looking at the outcome: a definition of internal conflicts that excludes 
the majority of such conflicts, adopted with a weak consensus. While com-
mon article 3 was approved with a large majority, Protocol II was accepted 
with 58 votes in favour, 5 against and the whole of 29 abstentions.125 The 
drafting process and the outcome of the 1974-1977 conference has been 
summarised as an exercise in missed opportunities.126
 
4.3 Assessment and Conclusions 
When one follows the development of the regulation of civil conflicts, from 
its birth through the doctrine of belligerency recognition to its formation lex 
lata as described in the previous chapter, one easily distinguishes a common 
denominator: states’ jealous protection of their sovereignty. This is hardly 
of no surprise, but nevertheless, seems to be the main explanation to why 
internal armed conflict has been and still is a concept of non- consensus, 
within the sphere of IHL as well in the field of migration law. 
 
Recognition of belligerency lent upon pure self- interest, either of the state 
under attack or of third states, thus barely on humanitarian considerations. 
The same amount of built- in discretion seem to have survived in the con-
temporary conceptions of internal conflict in IHL and migration law. Actu-
ally, in comparing the criteria of legitimate recognition of belligerency with 
the interpretation of an internal conflict under Swedish Aliens’ legislation, 
one sees mainly similarities: territorial control, responsible command and a 
degree of intensity (large- scale). 
 
In fact, the act of recognition of belligerency itself can be seen as equal to 
applying subsidiary protection. Because in a sense, when providing this pro-
tection the host state recognizes belligerency. And just as recognition of 
belligerency rarely took place because of economical and political consid-
erations, this could be as true when states apply subsidiary protection. This 
since one should not underestimate the significance of the diplomatic rela-
tions between states, on which international peace as well as the globalized 
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economy leans upon. Like the recognition of belligerency, the application of 
subsidiary protection at least indirectly, implies recognition of a situation 
having turned from a matter of domestic affairs into an issue of international 
concern. The application of subsidiary protection on the ground of armed 
conflict thus becomes a crossing point, where the recognizing state is at risk 
of losing diplomatic flexibility. Declaring a situation as amounting to an 
internal conflict could be understood as hostile, interfering with interests of 
the de jure government or other third states. The diplomatic ‘loss’ is imme-
diate concerning the parties involved in the conflict, but furthermore puts 
future international relationships in danger. From this view, the advantage 
of having an incoherent concept of armed conflicts, which invites different 
interpretations, is rather evident. The incoherency is meaningful and even 
desirable for states, in order to avoid a stable practice and being able to be-
friend several actors at the same time. The application of subsidiary protec-
tion is thereby intertwined with the diplomatic games played at the global 
arena. In situations where the international community with only few excep-
tions stands united, for example like in the conflict of Chechnya, the appli-
cation of protection (the act of recognition) is rather safe. In contrary, in 
conflicts like the ones of Iraq and Somalia where the interpretations diverge 
significantly amongst states, the risks at stake are higher. 
 
However, for all of this to be a valid contention within a Swedish context, 
one would have to prove that the judicial authorities are not independent 
from foreign policies. While this is not suggested to be ascertained within 
the frame of this thesis, the relevance of the argument is nonetheless persua-
sive. 
 
To conclude, the historical regulation and development of the concept of 
internal conflicts is a story of compromising. It shows that states never have 
had any true will to finally define the limit between domestic affairs and 
international regulation. Thus, from a historical perspective the incoherency 
of the lex lata definitions of internal conflicts in IHL as well in migration 
law becomes rather self-evident and, in a sense, logic. 
 
Seemingly, apart from now being black letter law, little has changed since 
the 18th century as regards the definition of armed conflicts itself. It is now 
time to look at the reality that this definition aims at regulating: the nature of 
conflicts from the 18th century up till today. 
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5 The Changing Face of Con-
flicts 
5.1 From External Wars to Internal Conflicts 
Until the end of 19th century most conflicts had been external wars. Civil 
wars and national unrests took place, but only to a limited extent in com-
parison with the contemporary occurrence. By the end of First World War, 
this ratio shifted and civil wars, revolutions and internal strives escalated. 
The reasons for this were several: the rise of new and unstable states, unem-
ployment, inflation and the big depression, together paved the way for up-
risings of varying degrees. Also sociological changes were triggering fac-
tors: an emerging well- educated working class and the expansion of social-
istic and democratic ideas revealed the gross inequalities of the predominant 
order.127 After Second World War the prevalence of internal conflicts be-
came even more significant128. The development of nuclear weapons made 
the governments reluctant to take recourse to open wars, instead pursuing 
their ends with other methods. But most of all great ideological and political 
changes and the backwash of the decolonization, contributed to escalating 
internal unrest.129
 
The wars and conflicts of the 20th century have not only altered from mainly 
external to mostly internal; also the ways in which these are fought have 
changed. One, at least in the academic literature of the field of peace- and 
conflict research, has begun to speak about ‘old’ and ‘new’ wars. The old 
wars occurred in a world order of centralized, hierarchically ordered and 
territorialized states. The impact of global processes (the ‘globalization’) 
has turned this image into an anachronism.130 The clear distinctions between 
public/private, state/non- state, civilians/military and politics/economics 
have blurred, making state interests only a nominal cause or goal of war. 
This is the pretext of the uprising of the new kinds of conflicts.131 But be-
fore going into the details of this, a brief overview of the old wars is neces-
sary. 
 
                                                 
127 E. Luard, ‘Civil Conflicts in Modern International Relations’ (1972), pp. 7-9 
128 Interestingly enough this seems no to have been anticipated by the drafters of the UN 
Charter, since article 2(7) clearly reaffirms the traditional rights of state Sovereignty. See 
further in E. Luard, ‘Civil Conflicts in Modern International Relations’ (1972), p. 22 et seq. 
129 E. Luard, ‘Civil Conflicts in Modern International Relations’ (1972), p. 9 and pp. 11-14 
130 M. Kaldor, New and Old Wars. Organized Violence in a Global Era, (Cambridge: Pol-
ity Press, 2nd edition, 2006), p. 17 
131 Ibid., pp. 21-22 
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5.2 The Old Wars 
Wars in a traditional legal sense, compromising armed battles between two 
sovereign states, were naturally intertwined with the development of the 
modern state. The notion of war as a matter of state affairs was established 
firstly by the end of 18th century. In this era, the monarchs and rulers allo-
cated state revenues to form standing armies with skilled soldiers, clearly 
distinguishable from civilians in wearing uniforms. The state’s monopoliza-
tion of the legitimate use of force was founded, simultaneously as the char-
acterizing distinctions of the modern state emerged: distinctions between 
intra- and interstate, between state and non- state and between legitimate 
and illegitimate use of force. In particular, the distinction of war and peace 
became clear; armed violence turned into a limited and isolated event, an 
aberration, instead of a continuous element of the daily world order.132
 
While the wars of the 17th and 18th centuries were relatively limited in char-
acter, the revolutionary wars prevailed in the 19th century.133 During this era 
the classic theories on warfare were developed134, and the fundamental rules 
of ius ad bello and ius in bello were codified. 135
 
The first half of the 20th century suffered two total wars, followed by the 
Cold War in the other half. It was in the two world wars that some of the 
elements of the new conflicts emerged. The indiscriminate bombings of 
civilians, argued as a military necessity, and the genocide of the Jewish 
community, were the first steps away from the previous clear distinction 
between the military and the civilian; the combatants and non- combatants. 
Notwithstanding this development the traditional legal notion of war, entail-
ing clear distinctions, survived. Thus, even though the wars from the 17th 
century to the mid 20th century were fought somewhat differently, they were 
all alike in being directly associated with the territorialized and centralized 
state.136 After 1945 new kinds of conflicts surfaced, involving other actors 
and techniques. But since they did not fit within the prevailing conception 
of war, they were overshadowed by the fear of another total war: the imag-
ined (Cold) war.137
 
                                                 
132 M. Kaldor, New and Old Wars. Organized Violence in a Global Era (2006), pp. 17-20 
133 Ibid., pp. 16-17 
134 Mainly by C. Von Clausewitz, writer of the classic piece On War (in translation by J.J 
Graham, London: N. Trübner, 1832) 
135 M. Kaldor, New and Old Wars. Organized Violence in a Global Era (2006), pp. 22 and 
26 
136 Ibid., pp. 16-17 and p. 27 
137 Ibid., p. 32 
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5.3 The New Conflicts 
5.3.1 A New War Economy 
The economy of old wars was based on a centralized administration in order 
to increase the efficiency of the war and to boost the revenues paying for it. 
A great part of the population was mobilized to participate as soldiers or as 
producers of arms and supplies. The war effort was designed to maximize 
the ability to use force so as to overpower the enemy. The economy of the 
new contemporary wars is just about the total opposite. They are highly 
decentralized and fragmented in character. Only a minor part of the popula-
tion is involved, due to lack of pay and often due to lack of legitimacy of the 
warring parties. Direct battles are uncommon; instead most violence is tar-
geted against the civilians.138 The statistics is painfully clear on this point: 
in the beginning of the 20th century about 85- 90 per cent of the victims 
were military, in Second World War the number lowered to 50 per cent and 
since the late 90s only 20 per cent of the loses have been military. The new 
conflicts vast impact on the civilian population is undeniable.139
 
5.3.2 New Kinds of Armies and Soldiers 
The new conflicts comprise a diversity of fighting units: public as well as 
private, state as well and non- state and even mixtures in between. Visibly, 
the frequency of regular armed forces is in decline and violence is increas-
ingly privatized. This is mainly due to incapability of governments to im-
plement economical and political reforms, leaving the revenues of many 
states scarce. Soldiers can no longer expect training or regular pay, and thus 
have to seek other sources of financial support. This becomes the seedbed of 
down- breaking discipline and hierarchy. It is no longer regular armed 
forces that are exclusively the legitimate bearers of arms, but also private 
paramilitary groups, blurring the difference between the two. The latter of-
ten consists of autonomous groups of armed men, conjoined by a particular 
extremist political faction. Since these groups rarely wear uniforms, other 
than eventual distinctive signs, it is hard to clearly distinguish them from the 
civilian population. The differentiation of combatants and non- combatants 
is thus less obvious. 140
 
The main difference between the armed forces of the old wars and the new 
ones is the type of organisation. In contrast even to guerrilla groups, the new 
forces are horizontal rather than vertical. They are both autonomous and 
cooperative at the same time, resembling the system of a spider wed. 141 An 
illustrative example of this is the parties operating in Iraq. They seem to 
consist of loose networks, mostly in the form of small cells, with varying 
                                                 
138 M. Kaldor, New and Old Wars. Organized Violence in a Global Era (2006), p. 95 
139 Ibid., p. 107 
140 Ibid., pp. 97-99 
141 Ibid., pp. 101-02 
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degrees of coordination. The actors are state as well as non- state in charac-
ter and the cells are much decentralized: the individuals usually don’t know 
the name of their leader nor the source for finance.142
 
5.3.3 A New Kind of Warfare 
The new warfare bears similarities with revolutionary warfare (as developed 
by ‘Che’ Guevara) and manoeuvre theory. The warfare implies great mobil-
ity and the strategy of surprise. One avoids battles in order to spare men and 
equipment and rather work by gaining support within the enemy territory, to 
be able to operate from ‘inside’. However, while revolutionary warfare was 
based on ideology, the new conflicts are based on ‘labels’ of identity, be 
they political, religious or ethnical. The main method of territorial control is 
thus displacement or even destruction, of persons with the wrong label.143 
The warfare aims at creating an unfavourable environment for the people 
the fighting party cannot or do not want to control. Hence, imposing con-
tinuous fear and insecurity and fuelling hatred of the ‘other’, are the instru-
ments of control, rather than territory as such. Furthermore, since the con-
flicts are no longer financed by state revenues, assets are gained mostly 
through loot, robbery, extortion and pillage. Control of food and supplies is 
important, forcing civilians to sell their valuables for very low prices in or-
der to survive.144
 
In sum, this gives that the new conflicts are characterized by systematic 
murders (like in Rwanda), by ethnical cleansing and forcible population 
expulsion (like in Bosnia- Herzegovina) and by intentional famine, destruc-
tion of homes and other actions rendering areas uninhabitable. In a sense, 
what used to be undesirable or illegitimate side effects in old wars, has be-
come the method of fighting in new conflicts.145 In addition, the blurred 
concepts of the new conflicts make it hard to actually tell even peace from 
war.146
 
5.4 Assessment and Conclusions 
As concluded in the previous chapter, the legal definition of armed conflicts 
has changed insignificantly since the days of recognition of belligerency. 
When one contrasts this concept with the changing face of conflicts, the 
discrepancy between the law and the reality becomes obvious. The nature of 
conflicts has shifted rather radically during the last decades: it has evolved 
from external state wars to internal privatized violence. Wars in a classical 
sense, fought between distinguishable sovereign states are becoming rare. 
Unfortunately not because the world is more peaceful today, but because 
                                                 
142 M. Kaldor, New and Old Wars. Organized Violence in a Global Era (2006), pp. 158-62 
143 Ibid., pp. 103-05 
144 Ibid., pp. 105-08  
145 Ibid., pp. 105-06 
146 Ibid., p. 117 
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they have been replaced by new kinds of conflicts: mostly internal with no 
clear lines between what is state and what is non- state; where there is a 
zone of peace and a zone of war; or who is a combatant and who is a civil-
ian. 
 
In order to protect the people affected by war and conflict, one would as-
sume that the law is adapted to this new reality. But this is not the case. The 
warfare of new conflicts entails displacement or even destruction of persons 
with the wrong label. Some of these persons fall under the scope of the 
Refugee Convention, if an individualised persecution can be shown. How-
ever, the formal criteria of the refugee definition fail to embrace the indis-
criminate character of armed conflicts. The regime of subsidiary protection 
aims at filling this shortcoming, but the legal concept of armed conflicts 
pertaining to it still does not reflect the reality. While the reality of conflicts 
is one of blurred concepts and distinctions, the law still relies on the as-
sumption of territorialized conflicts fought along military lines. Although 
this made perfectly sense until the end of Second World War, this image 
didn’t match the reality even in 1977, when the additional Protocols of the 
Geneva Conventions were adopted. It is quite clear that it was the most re-
cent experiences that determined the outcome of these negotiations. The 
horrors of the wars on national liberation were successfully put under the 
scope of international wars, leaving the regulation of ‘other’ internal con-
flicts behind. Ironically enough, the peak of wars on liberation turned out to 
be reached about the same time. But the weak states rising upon liberation 
instead became scenes of new horrors. Sadly, the high threshold of the more 
extensive protection of Protocol II has resulted in many of these conflicts 
escaping its application. 
 
Thus, the elements of the new conflicts are simply not caught within the 
stiff conception of armed conflicts in IHL and migration law. In particular 
two decisive factors are highly problematic: the limitation to conflicts in-
volving governmental forces, and the requirement of territorial control by 
the opposing party. The criterion of involvement by a governmental army 
does not embrace the fact that the use of such forces are in decline; the vio-
lence of today is highly privatized, partly because scarce state revenues can-
not provide for a standing army. This is not to say that governments are not 
involved in today’s conflicts, but the states’ monopoly on the legitimate use 
of force clearly seem to wane. Further, the requirement of territorial control 
is in total contradiction with how many contemporary internal conflicts are 
fought. Not only does the new warfare entail high mobility, but furthermore 
actual territorial control does not appear to be a primary goal of many insur-
gents. Instead of gaining control per se, the strategy rather seems to be to 
prevent anyone else from holding control. Targeting the civilian population 
inter alia by displacement or by infecting an area with constant horror is 
thus intrinsic to these types of conflicts. 
 
With all this in mind, it is quite astonishing that one, 30 years later after the 
adoption of Protocol II, still put faith to this definition. And, even more pe-
culiar, is the fact that it is this concept that founds the ground of the Swedish 
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subsidiary protection. Quite obviously, it is based upon an anachronic con-
ception of internal conflicts. 
 
In conclusion, by looking at conflicts in a historical perspective it becomes 
patently evident why the interpretation of internal armed conflicts in the 
Swedish Aliens’ Act appears as inadequate: it simply ignores the challenge 
of the changing face of contemporary conflicts. When importing the defini-
tion of Protocol II, one has missed the opportunity to adapt the requisites to 
modern conflicts. Even though the effect upon the civilian population is of 
great concern, this is surpassed by the assessment of the formal criteria (ter-
ritorial control, involvement by governmental forces etc) when determining 
on protection because of armed conflict. One could argue that this narrow 
approach is intentional in order to diminish refugee flows. However, if sub-
sidiary protection is truly meant to provide protection to those fleeing the 
horrors of armed conflict, one cannot apply such an excluding and outdated 
interpretation of the term, that most contemporary conflicts fall outside. 
Because if this is the case, one would be compelled to question the rele-
vance of having this ground for protection at all. Surely it is not surprising 
that states promise more in wording than what they intend to keep in action. 
However, given the development of conflicts as portrayed in this chapter, 
article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive, and the Swedish transposition of 
it, face a real risk of turning obsolete rapidly. Hardly this could have been 
intended to happen, only a few years after adoption. 
 
With this rather distressing conclusion on the table, it is time to look at an 
alternative solution, as provided within the sphere of peace- and conflict 
research. 
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6 An Alternative Interpretation: 
the Definition by the Uppsala 
Conflict Data Project 
There is a multitude of projects on conflict data collection, particularly 
within the field of peace- and conflict research. The field is diverse and 
complex, comprising a variety of definitions of armed conflicts. The defini-
tions can be either quantitative (eg. focus on causalities) or qualitative (eg. 
focus on magnitude and duration of conflict). Depending on the subject of 
research, different kinds of definitions are suitable. In any event, the defini-
tions or coding rules aim at simplifying the order of the world, to be able to 
analyse and understand it. Data collection projects thus provide researchers 
with data to develop academic theories or policy related arguments.147 Im-
portantly however, one should bear in mind that these data do not necessar-
ily reflect the reality per se, but rather provide for estimations to be care-
fully interpreted in research. 
 
6.1 Uppsala Conflict Data Project 
UCDP is a research program of the Department of Peace- and Conflict Re-
search at Uppsala University. The project has continuously collected data on 
ongoing armed conflicts in the world since the 1980’s. Their purpose is to 
collect information on conflicts, providing a base for research studies on 
origins, dynamics and resolutions of conflicts.148 The project uses a variety 
of sources comprising news agencies, newspapers, academic journals, re-
search reports, international, national and non- governmental organisations 
and even documents of the warring parties. The sources are regularly scruti-
nised in order to maintain high reliability.149 The definitions and data are 
used in various research projects around the world. For example, it is annu-
ally published in the report series States in Armed Conflict (Uppsala Univer-
sity), in SIPRI Yearbook (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), 
and in Journal of Peace Research (Sage).150
 
                                                 
147 T.B Seybolt (2002), ‘Measuring Violence: An Introduction to Conflict Data Sets” in 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’, SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, 
Disarmament and International Security, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 
81-96 at pp. 81 and 96 
148 Ibid., p. 89 
149 L. Harbom, States in Armed Conflict 2005, (Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict 
Research, Uppsala University, 2006), pp. 101-102 
150UCDP, Conflict Data Collection, <www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/States_in_Armed_ 
Conflict_Annual_Data_Eriksson1.htm>, visited on 2008-01-28 
 41
6.1.1 UCDP’s Definition of Internal Armed Conflicts 
UCDP defines internal armed conflicts as conflicts occurring between the 
government of a state and internal opposition groups. So called internation-
alized internal armed conflicts includes intervention of troops from other 
states.151 The intensity ranges from a scale of minor (at least 25 but less than 
1 000 deaths is a year) to war (more than 1 000 deaths in a year). 152
 
The concept of armed conflicts comprises: 
 
“a contested incompatibility which concerns government and/or territory where the 
use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a 
state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.”153
 
Use of armed force is considered to be the use of arms to endorse one’s po-
sition in the conflict, resulting in fatalities. Arms include any material 
means; manufactured weapons as well as sticks, stones, fire, water etc.154
 
A government is defined as a party controlling the capital of the state. This 
approach is chosen due to empirical studies, which show that governments 
de facto most often coincides with the party controlling the capital. This 
means that the government de jure is irrelevant. There is no requirement of 
a functional government, control over the capital is sufficient.155
 
Internal opposition groups comprise any non- governmental armed group 
with an announced name. The group has to be organized somehow, conduct-
ing planned political operations, rather than sporadic violence. The organi-
sation must be of such a degree, that the group poses an actual threat to the 
governmental party. The group can either be an umbrella organisation, com-
promising several sub- groups, or an individual organisation. Whichever 
that can be determined to take the final political decisions and have the main 
responsibility of the military actions, is regarded as the warring party.156
 
The concept battle- related deaths entail fatalities directly related to the in-
compatibility. These include the military or organised armed groups, state 
institutions, state representatives as well as civilians. This means that cau-
salities due to cross- fires or indiscriminate bombings are considered.157 The 
number of 25 battle- related deaths as the lower threshold of an armed con-
flict, is not based on any empirical grounds. Rather this variable has been 
chosen to be able to grasp all kinds of conflicts: minor as well as major.158
                                                 
151 L. Harbom, States in Armed Conflict 2005 (2006), p. 25 
152 UCDP, Definitions, <www.pcr.uu.se/database/definitions_all.htm>, visited on 2008-01-
28, keyword ‘intensity level’ 
153 Ibid., keyword ‘armed conflict’ 
154 Ibid., keyword ‘armed force, use of’ 
155 Ibid., keyword ‘government’ 
156 Ibid., keyword ‘opposition organization’ 
157 Ibid., keyword ‘battle- related deaths’ 
158 Information from e-mail correspondence (conflictdatabase@pcr.uu.se), with Ralph 
Sundberg, researcher and (temporary) in charge of the database 
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 6.1.2 Examples of Defined Conflicts 
UCDP has charted all armed conflicts since the end of Second World War. 
As regards conflicts occurring after 1989, detailed information about each 
conflict can be obtained from the UCDP database.159
 
To give an illustration of how the UCDP definition works the conflicts rele-
vant in the Swedish jurisprudence dealt with in this thesis will be rendered: 
Chechnya and Iraq. 
 
The situation of Chechnya was considered an internal armed conflict 
amounting to war in 1995- 2001 and in 2004. In 2002-2003 and 2005- 2006 
the situation was regarded as a minor internal armed conflict.160
 
As regards Iraq, the situation is defined as an internationalized internal 
armed conflict amounting to war since 2004. Battle- related deaths in the 
year of 2006 was estimated to a number of 3537 persons.161 Concerning the 
year of 2007, an official definition of the situation will be available first in 
spring of 2008. However, according to information form UCDP162, the 
situation in Iraq will undoubtedly be defined as an internal armed conflict 
involving the Government of Iraq. Most likely the conflict will amount to 
the intensity of war. 
 
6.2 A Suitable Solution within Migration Law? 
The UCDP provides for a well-defined and concrete definition of armed 
conflicts. It bears similarities with the concepts lex lata, as described in 
chapter 3. Equally to Protocol II and the Swedish interpretation, there is a 
requirement of a governmental party to the conflict. This criterion is well 
suited to the legal context of migration law. While this is not necessarily the 
case in IHL, there is a presumption in migration law that a person is in need 
of protection only if s/he is unable or unwilling, because of risk of 
harm/persecution, to avail him- or herself of protection of the state con-
cerned.163 It is usually only when the government itself is involved in the 
conflict, or is a passive bystander in an armed conflict between non- gov-
ernmental groups, that this presumption is met. 
 
                                                 
159 Available at <www.pcr.uu.se/database/basicSearch.php>, visited on 2008-01-28 
160 UCDP, Europe - Russia (Soviet Union) - General Information, <www.pcr.uu.se/ data-
base/conflictSummary.php?bcID=202>, visited on 2008-01-28 
161 UCDP, Middle East - Iraq - General Information, <www.pcr.uu.se/ data-
base/conflictSummary.php?bcID=178>, visited on 2008-01-28 
162 Information from e-mail correspondence (conflictdatabase@pcr.uu.se), with Ralph 
Sundberg , researcher and (temporary) in charge of the database 
163 This criteria is stipulated with various wordings but same content by article 1 A(2) of 
the Refugee Convention, articles 2(c) and (e) of the Qualification Directive, and chapter 4 
sections 1 and 2 of the Aliens’ Act. Cf. quoted passages in chapter 3. 
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Similarly to the legal definitions there is a requirement of a certain degree of 
organization of the opposing party, allowing them to perform planned op-
erations of armed violence. One strength of UCDP’s definition is that it ex-
plicitly takes into account umbrella organizations, since this corresponds 
well to the structure of many contemporary warring parties. Even though the 
acts of individual organizations per se do not amount to more than sporadic 
acts of violence, this can still be regarded as an internal armed conflict if the 
acts can be derived from an alliance or an umbrella organization sharing the 
same political goal. Although this would not necessarily be excluded from 
the definitions in lex lata, the organizational level required seems to be 
along the lines of traditional military structures. 
 
The main difference between the definition of UCDP and the legal ones is 
the requirement of 25 battle- related deaths. This is also its main weakness 
for several reasons, legal as well as non- legal. The term battle- related is 
problematic in terms of migration law since it includes both civilian and 
military fatalities. The purpose with subsidiary protection is inter alia to 
save those ‘involuntarily’ affected by conflicts. It does not necessarily con-
cern the persons actually fighting. If many soldiers die, but leaving the civil-
ians unaffected, the conflict is of scarce interest in the terms of migration 
policies. 
 
Furthermore, having a numerical variable is problematic. Applying a fixed 
number can be misleading as regards the severity of the conflict. This is in 
simple terms illustrated by an example: a conflict occurring in India (popu-
lation of 1 122 million) and a conflict occurring in Georgia (population of 
4.4 million) taking 25 lives is hardly comparable. Another problem is that it 
is difficult to establish an acceptable number as a variable. The number of 
25 is relatively low and the scope of application of subsidiary protection 
would thus be very extensive. For example, one could probably argue that 
governmental battles against drug cartels in some Latin American States, 
define as internal armed conflicts according to the UCDP definition. In the 
context of migration law, it would be difficult to contend that these conflicts 
should entail subsidiary protection. 
 
The question is if it would be even possible to settle a number on any em-
pirical or theoretical grounds, without facing puzzling moral dilemmas. One 
here touches upon an essential problem with the UCDP definition: while 
determining a numerical requisite in order to pursue academic research 
seems reasonable (you simply have to draw the line somewhere), this would 
be rather odd when dealing with legal protection of people in distress. One 
has to bear in mind that a conflict can be ever so severe upon the civilian 
population, without causing any actual deaths. Intolerable suffering in the 
form of run down food and water supplies or random torture and imprison-
ment is as much the reality of modern conflicts as definite death164. The 
human suffering in conflicts can hardly be reduced only to the number of 
fatalities. 
                                                 
164 As have been shown in chapter 5.1 
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Thus, taking one step back, looking again at the reasoning I have just pre-
sented, one easily acknowledges the peculiarities in turning a conflict to a 
question of number of human lives taken, rather than human lives affected. 
The introduction of a definition of conflicts similar to the one provided by 
UCDP, would turn subsidiary protection into a question of mathematics. 
Introducing a numerical requirement, in any form, would probably have 
undesirable consequences for the process of protection determination. While 
the determination would be foreseeable and thus legally certain, it would be 
in danger of transforming the protection assessment according to the princi-
ple of an assembly line. The individual assessment of each and every case, a 
sacred principle of migration law, would then be endangered. 
 
In conclusion, while the fusion of migration law and peace- and conflict 
research is interesting and may bear fruit as regards the understanding of 
conflicts, the exchange of definitions seems less suitable.  
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7 Summarizing Conclusions 
The aim of this thesis was to approach the concept of internal armed con-
flicts in the Swedish Aliens’ Act from three different perspectives, in order 
to grasp the full context of the term. How can the results of this be summa-
rized? 
 
The first perspective, the examination of lex lata, confirms my hypothesis 
that there exists no coherent or adequate definition of internal armed con-
flicts, neither in IHL nor in migration law. The Swedish Aliens’ legislation 
operates the definition laid down in Protocol II, without due regard to its 
specific context and origin, and thus any shortcomings of the concept in 
IHL are simply passed on into the application of subsidiary protection. A 
built-in margin of discretion is identified in all examined concepts, which 
concerning the Swedish Aliens’ Act is confirmed by an ambiguous case- 
law. The failure to clearly determine what an internal conflict is, leaves the 
ground of subsidiary protection unforeseeable and thus legally uncertain in 
the eyes of the applicant. 
 
From a historical perspective the incoherency comes as no surprise, since 
the concept internal armed conflicts have always struggled from non- con-
sensus. Actually, the view on internal conflicts is pretty much unchanged 
since the days of recognition of belligerency. Like the latter, the application 
of subsidiary protection is vulnerable to diplomatic considerations. When 
granting such protection to an applicant the host state actually implicitly 
recognizes, that the situation in the country of origin has turned from a pure 
domestic affair into an issue of international concern. Thus, the host state in 
a sense impinges on the sovereignty of the state in conflict, since it indicates 
that ius in bello has been triggered. In a world order where state sovereignty 
still is much appraised, and where economy and trade leans heavily upon 
friendly diplomatic relations, states avoid unwanted consequences by an 
ambiguous and unpredictable practice. From this point of view, the incoher-
ent interpretations of internal armed conflicts appears logic, and in fact, de-
sirable. 
 
The fact that the legal conception of armed conflicts has been more or less 
static since the 18th century, implies an escalating discrepancy between the 
black letter law and the reality it aims at regulating. This because the nature 
of conflicts, how and why they are fought, have changed radically during 
the last century. While the understanding of internal conflicts, in both IHL 
and migration law relies on the assumption of clear distinctions between 
war and peace; military and civilian; warfare and criminality, the reality of 
conflicts reflects a complex face of blurred concepts. Quite obviously the 
law bases itself upon an anachronic conception of the nature of conflicts. 
Thus, the ground of subsidiary protection because of internal conflict ap-
pears almost as an illusion, since it only refers to what today define as ex-
ceptional situations. If these formal criteria of what constitutes a conflict 
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continue to surpass the evaluation of the effect upon the civilian population, 
article 15 (c) and chapter 4 section 2 of the Aliens’ Act are rapidly turning 
obsolete. 
 
In my final perspective I looked into the field of peace- and conflict re-
search to see if an alternative and more suitable definition could be found 
there. While the UCDP provides for a very concrete and well defined con-
cept, the variable of 25 battle related deaths is at odds with the context of 
migration law and policies. Although the examination of UCDP fails to of-
fer any solution, it confirms a conclusion that seems to be valid for all my 
perspectives: that any concept of conflicts based on formal criteria is de-
ceivable, and indeed, impermanent. Just as the concepts of IHL and migra-
tion law, the UCDP definition formalizes the assessment of protection to 
such an extent that the actual situation of the civilians involved is overshad-
owed. The correlation between the field migration of law and peace- and 
conflict research is nonetheless interesting. This discipline is more closely 
related to the reality of conflicts and thus better equipped to deal with these 
issues than the judicial one. 
 
Having a concept of internal armed conflicts as a ground for protection ap-
pears to entail the infamous characteristics of catch 22. On the one hand, if 
the protection assessment is formalized one ensures predictability but at risk 
of narrowing the scope of protection. On the other hand, if the evaluation 
entails a larger margin of appreciation, there is a risk of discretion and the 
outcome becomes unforeseeable for the applicant. From this point of view, 
the current interpretation of internal armed conflicts in the Swedish Aliens’ 
Act, seem to embrace the worst of the two: it is based on very formal requi-
sites (article 1 of Protocol II) and gives room for discretion (the effect upon 
the civilian population). This approach puts heavy demands upon the shoul-
ders of the entities that apply the law: the Migration Courts and the Swedish 
Migration Board. The question is whether these are competent enough or 
even able to deal with the complex issues attached to the evaluation of 
armed conflicts. The question is also whether the problems as identified in 
this thesis should be solved by changing the law, or by changing the authori-
ties appointed to apply it. This will have to be answered by further research. 
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8 Final Remarks 
In my opinion, finding a solution to the incoherent use of the term ‘internal 
armed conflict’ within the European context is of undeniable importance. 
The lack of a common understanding of article 15(c) in the Qualification 
Directive implicates a ‘burden shifting’ of states. The interpretation of con-
flicts becomes a tool of adjusting one’s immigration policies, more than an 
actual legal assessment of protection. The example of the policies towards 
Iraqi asylum seekers in Europe during the last few years speaks its plain 
language. Undoubtedly, European states have benefited from Sweden’s wel-
coming policy, since more than a third of this influx of Iraqis has gotten 
protection here. And surely it is tempting to conclude that the shifting 
Swedish policy in 2007, had as much to do with an overloaded asylum pro-
cedure, as to an approving humanitarian situation in Iraq. 
 
As in many other issues when international and national law merge, a desir-
able solution would be the establishment of an autonomous international (or 
at least European) authority deciding in these matters. In an ideal global 
order, this competent, but politically independent body, could continuously 
determine the status of ongoing conflicts around the world. However, this 
scenario is nothing but a utopia. If not foolish, it would at least be naive to 
suggest that states would be willing to give up their sovereignty to such an 
extent. The political and economic interests at stake are simply too high and 
complex. 
 
It appears like Sweden is caught in the dilemmas of state sovereignty. On 
the one hand we want, at least according to our government, to keep our 
tradition of liberal and comparatively hospitable immigration policy. On the 
other hand, this seems impossible without overloading the welfare system, 
as long as other states within Europe remain reluctant to share the ‘burden’. 
And in a race between a friendly immigration policy and a system of guar-
anteed welfare, the former is the inevitable looser. Judging from the recent 
developments of the view on Iraqi and Somali asylum seekers, the race is 
already at full speed. 
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Supplement A – Legal Texts 
Common article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions: 
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory 
of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to 
apply, as a minimum, the following provisions: 
 
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces 
who have laid down their arms and those placed ' hors de combat ' by sickness, 
wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, 
without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or 
wealth, or any other similar criteria. 
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any 
place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: 
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel 
treatment and torture; 
(b) taking of hostages; 
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; 
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judg-
ment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees 
which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. 
 
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. 
 
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, 
may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict. 
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by means of 
special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention. 
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Par-
ties to the conflict. 
 
Article 1 of Additional Protocol II: 
1. This Protocol, which develops and supplements Article 3 common to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949 without modifying its existing conditions or applica-
tion, shall apply to all armed conflicts which are not covered by Article 1 of the Proto-
col Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Pro-
tection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) and which take place 
in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident 
armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, 
exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained 
and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol. 
 
2. This Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such 
as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not 
being armed conflicts. 
 
Article 15 of the Qualification Directive: 
Serious harm consists of: 
(a) death penalty or execution; or 
(b) torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of an applicant in the 
country of origin; or 
(c) serious and individual threat to a civilian's life or person by reason of indiscrimi-
nate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict. 
 49
 
Chapter 4 section 2 of the Aliens’ Act (2005:716): 
In this Act a ‘person otherwise in need of protection’ is an alien who in cases other 
than those referred to in Section 1 is outside the country of the alien’s nationality, be-
cause he or she 
1. feels a well-founded fear of suffering the death penalty or being subjected to corpo-
ral punishment, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 
2. needs protection because of external or internal armed conflict or, because of other 
severe conflicts in the country of origin, feels a well-founded fear of being subjected to 
serious abuses or 
3. is unable to return to the country of origin because of an environmental disaster. 
The corresponding applies to a stateless alien who is outside the country in which he or 
she has previously had his or her usual place of residence. 
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